WHAT WILL THE INTERNET DO TO SCHOLARSHIP?
DAVID A. BELL

HOW TELEVISION DISCOVERED GOD
LEE SIEGEL

E.J. DIONNE JR. Reports from Rome on Benedict XVI

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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CRISIS OF FAITH

low Fundamentalism s Splitting the GOP

NDREW SULLIVAN

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CORRESPONDENCE

BAD MEDICINE

ARNOLD S. RELMAN SAYS OUR CURrent health care system is in critical condition ("The Health of Nations," March 7). Unfortunately, his article failed in both its diagnosis and its prescription. He critiques the deficiencies in our system but proposes a utopian solution that could never exist. Although his model has been attempted and is currently in place in Canada, he neglects to examine its real world results.

In Canada, my home country, patients must wait months for procedures that are available in days in the United States, thanks to Canada's single-payer system. It may save the government money, but it costs patients plenty in pain, suffering, and anguish. If Relman is correct and "uncontrollable costs are the primary problem in our present system," then his proposal to put a huge government bureaucracy in charge of collecting taxes and allocating resources is not the answer. The solution is to move away from third-party payers and toward more individual responsibility for health care. This is the real promise of consumer-directed health care arrangements and why they will, over time, be adopted and embraced by Americans and their employers.

SALLY C. PIPES
President and CEO
Pacific Research Institute
San Francisco, California

I APPLAUD RELMAN FOR REMINDING us how badly our health care system needs reform. And I agree with him that our current system costs too much and provides too little in return. But Relman's analysis of the problem is self-serving. For example, sorely missing from his analysis is the enormous amount of paperwork required by payers (bureaucracy), the Food and Drug Administration's role in raising prescription drug prices (excessive regulation), the American Medical Association's monopoly on labor supply, and the exorbitant cost of medical malpractice insurance (runaway tort system). The Harvard Business School's Michael Porter argues that the real problem is competition that focuses on cost, not outcome. I believe health care is fundamentally an


WHY SELLING TO THE POOR WON'T MAKE THEM RICH
WHY HARVARD'S FACULTY ATTACKED LAWRENCE SUMMERS
THE NEW REPUBLIC
HEALTH CARE IS NOT A BUSINESS
ARNOLD S. RELMAN

economic decision. If patients had information on treatment options, prices, and outcomes (quality)—at both a systemic and physician level—and if patients were free to choose any doctor, the system would deliver high-quality care at low cost. We need to shift the basis of competition, not replace it with central planning. This is not to suggest that providing care to the poor is unimportant, only that it is a separate issue.

STEVE DAWSON
Londonderry, New Hampshire

I HAVE BEEN A PROVIDER IN THE health care system for 30 years. I agree with Relman's analysis of the way resources are currently misapplied, but his solution doesn't address the problem of implementation. He promotes a cap on spending without showing how this will be sold to the public. I don't think consumers are ready to hear the "R" word (rationing) in relation to their own health care. And the medical-industrial complex has always been ready to exploit this fear of denial of access or services to defeat reform. Do any of our current politicians have the credibility or courage to try to educate the public about the fact that we have no choice but to reduce the growth in health care costs?

BERNARD LARNER, MD, PhD
Orinda, California

RELMAN'S TRENCHANT ANALYSIS of the health care system cites critiques that are uncannily similar to those made of the public education system. Both fields are being vigorously promoted as ideal candidates for an open marketplace to cure their respective ills. In education, this approach takes the form of competition among providers of various curricula, advertising based on standardized test scores, and parental choice of schools. What is downplayed throughout the campaign to commercialize medicine and education is that practitioners in the two professions will be forced to abandon the service ethic that undergirds their decisions to become healers and educators in the first place. The brave new world of economics will also assure that those most in need of quality medical care and quality schooling will be precisely those least likely to receive them.

WALT GARDNER
Los Angeles, California

ARNOLD S. RELMAN RESPONDS:
If Sally C. Pipes really believes that the reformed health care system I propose "has been attempted and is currently in place in Canada," then she hasn't read my article carefully enough or, despite her nationality, she doesn't understand Canada's problems. I didn't mention Canada, but she should know that it devotes much less of its national economy to health care than the United States. If it spent as much as we do, Canada's waiting lists could be eliminated and there would be much less public complaint. I don't propose to reduce U.S. health expenditures to the Canadian level, but rather to reform

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
WE COULD SAVE BILLIONS IN HEALTHCARE COSTS IF WE COULD JUST GET AMERICANS ON THEIR FEET.
Walking 10,000 steps a day can help Americans lose weight, lower their cholesterol and reduce the risk of heart attack. Tackling preventable health problems not only saves lives, it could save the healthcare system up to $40 billion a year.
That's why BlueCross and BlueShield Plans launched WalkingWorks® – to encourage people to simply add steps to their daily routines.
It's not brain surgery. Just another easy way to help keep healthcare affordable.
To find out more about our WalkingWorks® program, visit bcbs.com.
BlueCross BlueShield Association
An Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans
Healthcare. Affordable. Now.

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Morning-After Sickness

TRB FROM ANN ARBOR

IT IS NO GREAT SECRET THAT DEMOcrats have been losing political fights over abortion for a while. And it's no great secret why. Although a majority of Americans agree with liberals that abortion should be legal, the right has succeeded in starting political debates that end up making liberals look like extremists. One method has been to focus on partial-birth abortion, a practice that most Americans oppose because it seems cruel. Another successful strategy, as William Saletan explains in the book *Bearing Right*, has been to push parental consent laws, turning the argument about abortion into a referendum on public attitudes toward sex and the rights of parents. But cultural conservatives have never ceded the more extreme elements of their agenda—something that will become apparent if a new controversy gets the scrutiny it deserves.

At issue is Plan B, a drug manufactured by Barr Laboratories and better known as the "morning-after pill." Plan B is a very high dosage of progesterone, the hormone that promotes pregnancy when produced naturally by a woman's body but prevents pregnancy when taken in a standard birth-control regimen. The problem with birth-control pills is that they only work when taken before intercourse, which is where Plan B comes in. It turns out that an elevated dose of progesterone taken soon after intercourse also prevents pregnancy, though its effectiveness diminishes quickly with time. Women can get this large quantity of progesterone simply by taking several birth-control pills together rather than over several days, as they would normally. Women's Capital Corporation, since bought by Barr, eventually got the idea of producing and marketing a single dose of progesterone designed specifically for use after intercourse, to be made available by prescription. In 1999, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the application.

The move got little attention amid the controversy over RU-486, the chemical compound that induces abortions even weeks into pregnancy (something Plan B can't do). But use of Plan B remains infrequent, partly because it can be difficult to obtain the drug quickly enough. As a result, women's health advocates have embraced a Barr proposal to make Plan B available "behind the counter"—meaning pharmacists could dispense it without a prescription—to women over 16 years of age.

This time, conservatives are making noise. A year ago, 49 Republican representatives wrote President Bush, urging him to block approval of Barr's FDA application. And, while the FDA's own scientific advisory panel endorsed the application by a vote of 23 to four, the Agency has withheld approval. Early this month, Senators Hillary Clinton and Patty Murray announced they would place an indefinite "hold" on the nomination of the FDA's acting director, Lester Crawford, to become its permanent director until the Agency issued a ruling. (Unrelated issues have since stalled Crawford's nomination.) Meanwhile, stories of pharmacists refusing to fill Plan B prescriptions are cropping up. Early this month, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich issued an emergency rule requiring pharmacies, as publicly licensed health care providers, to dispense the medications, even if employees object. Conservatives there are trying to overturn the order.

Plan B's most outspoken critic, the right-wing Concerned Women for America, insists it is actually worried about safety, given the lack of studies on the pill's long-term effects. But the vast majority of medical experts say Plan B is completely safe, in part because birth-control pills have such a well-established safety record themselves. According to the Guttmacher Institute, Plan B was available in 2002 without a prescription in 26 countries, including Switzerland, Israel, and Congo.

A less flimsy argument against Plan B is that it is tantamount to abortion. While science has demonstrated that Plan B works, it has not shown definitively *how* Plan B works. And, although most researchers believe that it acts by postponing ovulation or preventing fertilization, it could also prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus—which, according to some pro-life groups, is murder. That's a perfectly respectable, intellectually consistent position for people who believe life begins at the instant when sperm meets egg. But it's also a very severe standard, given that fertilized eggs naturally fail to implant 40 to 60 percent of the time. This is one reason that the medical establishment defines pregnancy as beginning only when a fertilized egg has implanted.

The other serious argument against Plan B is that it will increase risky sexual activity by young people. But peer-reviewed studies published in mainstream medical publications (like one just published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*) have repeatedly found no such link. Of course, conservatives argue that making emergency contraception available sends a broader cultural message about the acceptability of premarital sex. But, even if that were true, there are the likely benefits of Plan B to consider. James Trussell, a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University, has estimated that, if emergency contraceptives were widely available in this country, they could reduce the approximately 1.3 million abortions that take place yearly in this country *by half*. If a culture of life is so sacrosanct, shouldn't that trump the issue of premarital sex?

When conservatives talk about Plan B, they conjure up images of lust-crazed college girls engaging in one-night stands, then reaching over empty beer bottles to grab their supersized Plan B jars. But the one group to whom emergency contraception would make the greatest difference is rape victims. According to Trussell, who studied statistics from 1998, about 22,000 of the 25,000 women who became pregnant from rape could have prevented pregnancy with emergency contraception. Unfortunately, the new federal hospital guidelines for rape treatment released in January mysteriously omitted Plan B, even though a previous draft had included it. In Colorado, conservatives have fought efforts to impose a guideline that includes emergency contraceptives. Apparently, elements of the right are so committed to their stark definition of life and so concerned about hypothetical cultural signals that they would prefer rape victims become pregnant than inform them about emergency contraception. Who are the extremists now?

JONATHAN COHN

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Religious Sanction

EARLIER THIS YEAR, when Bill Frist invoked some grainy video footage and his cardiology training to overturn the prevailing medical consensus about Terri Schiavo's brain, we marveled at the specimen housed within the Senate majority leader's own cranium—a mind at once cynical and craven, and with the capacity for ever-greater feats of cravenness and cynicism in his quest for the GOP's 2008 presidential nomination.

Frist has not disappointed. Last Thursday, the venerable Tennessee senator announced that he would participate in an upcoming Family Research Council event called Justice Sunday. The purpose of this wholesome evening of God and good cheer, say its conservative evangelical organizers, is to expose how Senate Democrats are blocking the president's judicial nominees out of prejudice toward their religious beliefs. "The filibuster was once abused to protect racial bias," reads a flyer promoting the event. "[A]nd it is now being used against people of faith."

The substance of this charge is almost too stupid to rebut. But, as the majority leader has seen fit to lend it his imprimatur, here goes. We begin by noting that Democrats, despite their alleged hostility to believers, have somehow found it within themselves to approve the overwhelming majority of the president's judicial nominees—over 200 confirmed; ten blocked—even though a similarly overwhelming majority of nominees would probably term themselves God-fearing Christians. What's more, we can say with some confidence that, to the extent that a tiny handful of judges is indeed anathema to Senate Democrats, it is the nominees' extreme judicial and ideological views, not their religious ones, that makes them so. Many have the kind of contempt for settled precedent—particularly when it comes to abortion—to qualify them as "activist judges," to borrow a phrase. Others have invoked radical legal theories in their efforts to overturn commonsense environmental regulations and family leave laws.

Leveling the anti-faith charge against Democrats is, at heart, simply an exercise in the crudest form of identity politics—the idea that questioning a person's views is tantamount to discriminating against that person's identity group. It's the exact same kind of argument conservatives rightly rejected when African American liberals embraced it in the 1980s and 1990s. It is no more compelling now that the right is embracing it today.

Frist's cry of religious bigotry is particularly ironic: What could be more religiously bigoted than claiming that anyone who disagrees with you must not be a true person of faith? How audacious—and repugnant—of Frist to claim that his political constituents have a monopoly on devotion to God. Many Senate Democrats are themselves devout Christians. And Democrats routinely win the votes of about half the nation's Catholics, over half of its religious Jews, and nearly one-third of its evangelical Christians.

Why would an ostensibly intelligent man like Frist embrace such an obviously ludicrous argument? Our hunch is that it has to do with a dynamic that has plagued the GOP since last fall's election. Religious conservatives believe—and the press has constantly reminded them—that they provided the margin of victory for Bush's reelection. Indeed, these conservatives now see themselves as the most powerful constituency of the country's dominant political party. And yet, for all their supposed political power, gay marriage and abortion are still constitutional; prayer in school and public displays of religious paraphernalia are, for the most part, not.

Faced with this set of facts, fundamentalist conservatives can conclude one of two things: that they have been duped—which is to say, the GOP never intended to enact their agenda; it simply used them to win reelection—or that some insidious external force has intervened to block that agenda. The GOP leadership, which would prefer not to anger the James Dobsons of the world, has a strong interest in promoting the latter explanation.



And so Americans are treated to an ever-expanding list of all-powerful bogeymen. To the list of golden oldies like activist judges, the liberal press, Hollywood elites, Manhattan elites, Berkeley elites, et cetera, conservatives have recently added the likes of George Soros, Michael Schiavo, and, of course, those chronically filibustering, anti-religious Senate Democrats.

One can only guess at what manner of liberal ogre Bill Frist will have to invent if all his pandering eventually lands him in the White House. But there is one thing about which we are certain: Should the need arise, the good doctor will be up to the task. ■

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NOTEBOOK

QUESTIONS FOR ALBERTO G. . . . SURFER JUSTICE KENNEDY

PATRIOT GAMES

EARLY THIS MONTH, WHEN ATTORney General Alberto Gonzales took his case for renewing several provisions of the Patriot Act before the Senate Judiciary Committee, his interlocutors were not wholly convinced. Naturally, the newly confirmed A.G. turned on the charm. He even injected some rhetorical flourish in defending a few particularly controversial provisions of the Act, which the Justice Department admitted it had never actually had occasion to use. "It's comparable to a police officer who carries a gun for 15 years and never draws it. Does that mean that, for the next five years, he should not have that weapon because he had never used it?" he asked metaphorically. Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter spoke up for his stone-faced colleagues: "Attorney General Gonzales, I don't think your analogy is apt." Tough crowd.

Luckily, Gonzales has since found a more credulous audience for his arguments—the American people. Last week, the White House's website featured the A.G. in its ongoing Q&A series with administration officials. The queries, emanating from such far-flung locales as Channahon, Illinois, and Lakeville, Connecticut, mostly related to the Patriot Act. Some demanded, gently, to know about the law's effect on civil rights, others about intelligence-gathering and the rate of terrorist attacks.

In an amazing feat of brevity, the attorney general managed never to exceed a few sentences in his explanations. For instance, when Brian of Erlanger, Kentucky, wondered "what you have to say to the critics of the patriot act, who think that it is illeagle [sic], or unconstitutional," Gonzales offered his assurance that "various provisions have already been challenged and upheld in our courts." (That federal judges have twice struck down parts of the law found to violate First and Fourth Amendment rights was not worthy of notice, presumably in the interest of concision.) To Rick of Worcester, Massachusetts, who sought Gonzales's opinion on what to "say to those who irrationally oppose this Act," the A.G. suggested this masterpiece of suasion: "I believe the facts demonstrate that the Department of Justice has used the authorities under the PATRIOT Act with a great deal of care." Maybe he should have tried that one on Specter.

Alberto Gonzales

PYRAMID SCHEME

IT WAS A BUSY WEEK: THE CATHOLIC Church elected an archconservative Pope, Robert Mugabe threw himself a 25-year I'm-still-the-president-so-nuts-to-you party, and John Bolton suppressed the urge to throw his water glass at members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and chase them around the table. Most momentous of all was the news from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA): We have a new food pyramid.

We were just getting used to the old food pyramid. The passing of its predecessor, the food wheel—unceremoniously retired in 1992—had been troubling: What civilization reverts from wheel to pyramid? But experts said that the wheel had been misleading, that it had implied that each of the four food groups (an outdated concept; soon there would be five) merited equal—and, in the United States, equally large—servings. And, with 68 million Americans already estimated to be overweight or obese, pyramid-backers had a strong argument that drastic change was needed.

Thirteen years later, a case can be made that the pyramid has helped. While the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently estimated that the number of overweight or obese Americans has increased to about 130 million, there's nothing to show that the numbers would not have been much higher under the reign of the wheel. Were it not for the tetrahedron, perhaps the cumulative weight of our countrymen and women would be pressing certain regions of the country dangerously below sea level. Nevertheless, there is always room for some fine-tuning.

The USDA claims that the new pyramid (well, actually, there are twelve new pyramids—and the important thing is to find the one that's right for you) turns the old pyramid on its side. While careless observers might have overlooked the effect of such a maneuver on an equilateral triangle, even a stingy soul must notice the most prominent changes: the six colored stripes that now run from bottom to top, and the staircase running up the left side. The staircase represents exercise, the stripes represent food groups, and the pyramid shape represents—well, let's not try to decipher everything. The point is: We're obese. The result is twelve new food pyramids. Each has a staircase. But, for now, the staircase is only on one side.

DAVID COWLES

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That means we're not that big yet. When the USDA announces a food ziggurat, we'll know we're really in trouble.

INCREDIBLE OUTRAGE

"AND NOT ONLY THAT, HE SAID IN session that he does his own research on the Internet? That is just incredibly outrageous."

—Tom DeLay, criticizing Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy on a Fox News Radio program on April 19

WHO'S PATHETIC NOW?

"WHICH IS WHY WE GREET BUSH'S plan to cap agriculture subsidies with a heavy dose of skepticism. ... The plan came out of nowhere; though the farm lobby got wind of the impending proposal last week, it was preceded by no widespread call for reform, no impending crisis, no congressional debate. Nor was there the usual folksy p.r. rollout of town-hall meetings and Midwestern stump speeches so typical of Bush's major initiatives, such as Social Security privatization. All of which suggests that the president is taking the idea none too seriously."

—THE NEW REPUBLIC's editors, February 21, 2005

"Their editorial is just pathetic. They like the proposed cuts but hate Bush so much that they can't give him any credit for it. Their excuse is that Bush clearly doesn't intend for his proposal to pass, and the evidence they provide for that view basically amounts to their own distrust of him. This is not serious thought."

—Ramesh Ponnuru, *National Review* senior editor, criticizing TNR that same week

WASHINGTON—After two months of fierce resistance from farmers and Congress, the Bush administration has dropped an effort to cut government payments to farmers.

—Associated Press, April 13, 2005

TNR.commentary

&c.

NOAM SCHEIBER

FINE YOUNG DEANIACS: *American Prospect* writer and blogger Matt Yglesias has the right interpretation of the recent Pew Center survey of Deaniacs. According to the survey, Dean supporters tend to have much more faith in multilateralism than Democrats overall, and they tend to be much more in favor of keeping troops in Iraq now that we're there. The survey also reports that, the younger the Dean supporter, the more hawkish he or she is likely to be. As Yglesias puts it in his blog:

> The core constituency for socially progressive, internationalist liberalism is, in fact, among the young, highly educated Dean backers who come to mind when one thinks of the MoveOn crowd. These folks vehemently believe the Iraq War was a bad idea, but are generally more supportive than most Democrats of both pre-emptive war and nation-building.

The irony is that both the youngish Deaniacs and the neocons can be considered foreign policy idealists. They just have radically different visions of how their idealism should be implemented. (The Deaniacs favor multilateralism; the neocons disdain multilateral institutions.) Yglesias notes that the youngish Deaniacs account for an exceedingly small portion of the Democratic Party. But, in sheer numerical terms, I'd say they're a far greater presence than the neocons are in the Republican Party. It's yet another reason I think that, once we get beyond the extremely partisan passions evoked by the war in Iraq—and the Deaniacs were the most passionate of all—the Democrats are more likely to be the party of foreign policy idealism than the Republicans. (I'm particularly encouraged by the fact that McGovern-era suspicions of U.S. power seem to be dying out with McGovern-era liberals.)

IRAQ'D

SPENCER ACKERMAN

MARLA RUZICKA, 1976–2005: I didn't know Marla Ruzicka very well. That's largely because I've never been to either Iraq or Afghanistan, where she built her reputation for ceaseless activism on behalf of the civilian victims of the wars. I met her about a year ago at a party in Washington, where that reputation largely preceded her. Discussing her humanitarian work, she was engaging and serious but never didactic, passionate but not fevered, outraged but not angry. Judging from the people I spoke with after we chatted, her name might as well have been That's Marla Ruzicka, intoned in a manner that conveyed: You wouldn't believe the amount of good that this one very young woman is capable of.

In my very limited experience, it wasn't strictly the case that, as Robert Worth wrote in *The New York Times* this week, "[S]he used [social] occasions to lobby reporters to write about the things that mattered to her," since she was just as eager to weigh in on any number of less important subjects. But it was absolutely clear, from even the briefest of encounters, that what mattered to Marla was the plight of innocent people trapped in the middle of conflict. She went door to door in Baghdad collecting statistics on civilian casualties at tremendous personal risk and then spent untold hours lobbying government officials for aid to alleviate the suffering of the survivors. (I have a stack of e-mails from her imploring me to write about compensation for civilian victims of the Iraq war, which I'm ashamed to say never resulted in a piece.)

To Marla, the United States had simply incurred a responsibility to take care of Afghans and Iraqis, and she took it upon herself to ensure that we lived up to the bargain. She also stood up for the troops who aided the Iraqi people and who helped her carry out her mission. After Marine General James Mattis remarked that "it's fun to shoot some people," Marla wrote to *The New York Times*, "I have worked with many of our servicemen who have helped me assist innocent civilians injured accidentally by American forces. It is not fair that their acts of kindness and care are misrepresented." Insisting on basic human dignity was the imperative for Marla, whether it was the dignity of the soldier or the civilian.

On Saturday, April 16, I was at the same place where I met Marla a year ago when we got a phone call reporting that she was killed in Baghdad. A suicide bomber had attacked a convoy she was traveling near. Marla was 28. A quote from the brother of a teenager Marla was seeking to bring to the United States for medical care summed up the wrenching feeling that came over all of us: "God bless her pure soul. She was trying to help us." The organization she founded, the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, has resolved to continue her work, which is surely what she would have wanted. After all, That's Marla Ruzicka. RIP.

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Rome Dispatch

Benedictus

BY E.J. DIONNE JR.

SHORTLY BEFORE NOON on the day that Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger was elected Pope Benedict XVI, I was standing in St. Peter's Square with a smart young Carmelite priest from Ireland. We were watching black smoke pour out of what, for a few days at least, was the most famous chimney in the world. That meant no Pope, yet.

By chance, or perhaps thanks to the Holy Spirit's intervention, Father Simon Nolan was just the kind of Catholic who could give me faith in the Church's future. He is a philosopher who studies medieval topics, and he was orthodox, warm, and open. We talked about Ratzinger's attack on the "dictatorship of relativism" in his sermon at the Mass that had opened the conclave on Monday morning.

Father Nolan said he sympathized with what Ratzinger said, because relativism meant that there were no truths that mattered. That meant there could be "no real arguments." If parties in a discussion believed that truth existed, he said, they would care passionately about what the other was claiming. No truth, no serious arguments—a good Catholic position that has much to say to the world.

But Father Nolan also expressed his worries about those who would back away from engaging the world as it exists and from joining those arguments. (Let me put on the record, to ensure that the good Carmelite's career goes forward, that he did not say this in reference to the soon-to-be Pope Benedict.) He did not like the idea of a Church that closed itself off intellectually. He thought the Church could be firm in insisting on what was right and still learn things from its interlocutors outside. He believed that the most likely outcome of the conclave would be a compromise Pope, and he thought it would be good for the Church.

At about 6 p.m., I was writing at Rome's Associated Press bureau on the assumption that the next smoke out of the chimney would also be black. Suddenly, the Italian reporter on the television behind me burst out: "White smoke! White smoke! We have a Pope!"

I tore out of the office and joined the rush of humanity walking and running down the corso Vittorio Emmanuele to get to the Vatican before the *habemus papam* announcement was made. I was hoping that Nolan would be proved right about his compromise candidate. But I was anxious: An early result was favorable to a Ratzinger papacy, because he went into the conclave with, as far as anyone can tell, the one and only large bloc of votes.

Ten minutes after I arrived in St. Peter's Square, the red drapes at the window near the top of the great basilica parted, and figures emerged. Then the announcement came in Latin: It was Ratzinger, and he would be Pope Benedict XVI.

IT WOULD BE far better to claim that my response was pure. It was not. As a journalist, I had to cheer the Ratzinger choice. Twenty years ago, I had developed a fascination with Ratzinger as the Pope's intellectual tough guy, the man who was enforcing Pope John Paul II's version of orthodoxy. I had written a long *New York Times Magazine* piece about Ratzinger, and he had granted a written interview that was remarkably frank about who he was and why he thought as he did. I had respected his honesty. Just that morning, my column in *The Washington Post* had declared Ratzinger to be the central figure in the conclave. A smart editor had written the headline "CARDINAL RATZINGER'S CHALLENGE," which made it appear that I knew everything in advance. God was looking out for me: We columnists are quite capable of looking very dumb, so I was grateful for this reprieve.

Yet, as a Catholic, I was petrified. Pope Benedict's vision of the Church is that it should comprise a tough band of orthodox believers who confront modernity and uphold the truths the Church teaches, without any hesitations. If that means a smaller Church, with squishy doubters or dissenters left by the wayside, so be it. He is skeptical of feminists and any changes in the nature of the priesthood. He used his power as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, a Vatican office charged with safeguarding Church teaching, to condemn dissenters, such as the Reverend Charles Curran, a theologian who just happened to agree with the vast majority of American Catholic married couples that "artificial" birth control was morally acceptable.

Most troubling was his sense of the Church's trajectory since the 1960s. I am part of the generation of Catholics shaped by the Second Vatican Council of Pope John XXIII. Pope John and the Council abandoned the Church's absolute opposition to modernity—and to democracy, liberalism, religious toleration, and the Enlightenment. In his important new book, *The Catholic Revolution*, Father Andrew Greeley asks exactly the right question: "Did the Church really expect to survive the changes brought about by science and democracy and reason without altering itself in any way?" The answer is obvious. The Church under Pope John was not selling out. It was doing what had helped it survive for over 2,000 years. By absorbing lessons from other philosophical shores, the Church was making itself more, not less, Christian.

But Pope Benedict worries that more was lost than gained in this process. He has said that the post-Conciliar years were "decidedly unfavorable for the Catholic

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Church." In the '80s, he told the Italian journalist Vittorio Messori, "What the Popes and the Council Fathers were expecting was a new Catholic unity." "Instead, one has encountered a dissension which seems to have passed over from self-criticism to self-destruction."

The new Pope's rejection of a past in which he played a significant part as a young Conciliar theologian is, in large part, the product of his horror at the excesses of the '60s left. This sentiment is familiar to neoconservatives, and even to editors of this magazine. In that interview for the *Times*, Ratzinger declared, "I think that, in those years, I learned where discussion must stop, because it is turning into a lie, and resistance must begin, in order to maintain freedom."

I worry that Pope Benedict sees liberal Catholics primarily as products of the worst excesses of the '60s and not as people who are genuinely grateful for the Catholic tradition and the Church's efforts since Pope John to interpret it anew for our times. Many of us know that modernity urgently needs criticism and agree with the new Pope on the importance of asserting that truth exists. We remain Catholic precisely because we think that the Church's emphasis on the sacramental and the communal provides a corrective to a culture that overemphasizes the material and lifts up the narrowest forms of individualism.

But we also think that not all that is new is bad. Our Church was soft on slavery. It was terribly slow to embrace democracy. It still does not seem to understand that the desire of women for power in the Church reflects legitimate—and, yes, Christian—claims to justice, not weird ideological enthusiasms. Those who say that change in the Church is simply capitulation to a flawed culture must explain whether they really think the Church would be better off if it had not come to oppose slavery, endorse democracy, and resist anti-Semitism and other forms of religious intolerance.

As soon as Pope Benedict was elected, leaders and spokesmen for the Church understood they had a problem. The new Pope was on record as saying many things that liberal and moderate Catholics, especially in the United States and Europe, find troubling. Cardinals and bishops quickly went into damage control. They argued that the Pope's critics should give him a chance. They suggested he could be a Nixon-to-China sort, exceptionally sensitive to the range of Catholic opinion.

I have too much respect for Ratzinger's intellectual integrity to believe that *he* believes in this p.r. campaign. But he is now the leader of the Church, not simply a theologian or the previous Pope's enforcer. His choice of the name Benedict suggests he wants to re-evangelize the West, as the original St. Benedict did. But good evangelizers don't toss potential allies overboard. They don't assume that those to whom they preach have nothing to teach back. The Catholic Church can become a diminished sect of purists. Or it can retain a broad cultural and intellectual influence on a world that needs what it has to say. Pope Benedict XVI has to decide which it will be. ■

Bogotá Dispatch

Office Politics

BY RACHEL VAN DONGEN

On a recent Saturday morning, President Álvaro Uribe held the Colombian equivalent of a town-hall meeting in Málaga, Santander Province. Tieless in a casual plaid shirt and standing before a gigantic seal of Colombia, Uribe praised the locals for their generous hospitality that "increases our love for the great Colombian people" and then lauded Málaga's efficient new airport. After a brief speech, Uribe introduced Transportation Minister Andrés Gallego to the crowded room. Gallego launched into a detailed presentation of the number of roads, bridges, and tunnels being constructed in Santander under Uribe's watch. He then introduced another official, Mauricio Ramírez, head of the National Roads Institute, who further summarized government projects in the area. "We aren't cutting even one kilometer. We are paving all of them," Ramírez boasted.

The Málaga event is typical of right-wing President Uribe's "community councils," as they are known here. A staple of Uribe's unconventional and wildly popular presidency, the president and rotating members of his cabinet travel every Saturday morning to a far-flung region of Colombia to hear about local problems and personally offer solutions, usually before an audience of hundreds. The community councils fit Uribe's image as a workaholic president for whom no detail of government is too small or inconsequential.

And yet the community councils also highlight what is so worrisome about the Uribe government. Broadcast for as long as 12 hours on Colombia's public TV station, Señal Colombia, they amount to a taxpayer-funded political advertisement for Uribe, who has sponsored an initiative to change the Colombian constitution to allow presidents to seek a second term. The reelection proposal has passed the Colombian congress, but it faces several Constitutional Court challenges before Uribe can be on the ballot in 2006. Some are predicting the amendment may be disallowed, in which case Uribe may mount a write-in campaign.

Uribe's reelection would be bad news for Colombia, breeding an inadvisable authoritarian tradition in a country that has never had one. Most disturbingly, the constitutional amendment was passed for Uribe's narrow political benefit and wouldn't strengthen institutions in a country where they are already weak. In short, Uribe's reelection bid will damage Colombian democracy, and it threatens to destabi-

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lize a country that is just beginning to remake itself after 41 years of violence.

DESPITE MYRIAD OTHER problems, Colombia has paradoxically enjoyed one of the longest-standing democracies in South America. Unlike other countries in the region, Colombia has not given rise to military strongmen, or *caudillos*, like Chile's Augusto Pinochet or the Argentine junta. In modern times, Colombia has had just one military dictator, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who was booted from power in 1957 by an agreement between Colombia's two main political parties to form a power-sharing arrangement known as the National Front. Reelection was formally prohibited in the 1991 constitution (before that, presidents could seek a second term nonconsecutively).

The relative weakness of the Colombian government is one reason leftist rebels known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (called by their Spanish acronym, FARC) have been able to keep their struggle alive since 1964. Right-wing paramilitaries, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (known by the acronym AUC) stepped in to fight the FARC in the 1980s after wealthy landowners became frustrated by the lack of government action. A stronger central government could help diminish violence, but that wouldn't necessarily happen by extending the president's term. Even with an aggressive military campaign by Uribe, the FARC rebels have stepped up their attacks in what some argue is an attempt to derail Uribe's efforts to secure a second term. In early April, the FARC killed 17 government soldiers in a rocket attack, and, most recently, they launched an assault on the southwestern town of Toribío, killing and wounding both policemen and civilians.

Uribe and company argue that reelection is a crucial means to continue the president's promising fight against "narco-terrorists" (both the FARC and AUC are heavily involved in drug trafficking). But, the way the amendment was cleverly written, it would benefit Uribe without helping to strengthen Colombia's institutions. Indeed, the provision prohibits sitting governors and mayors from challenging him for president. That clause was aimed at Bogotá Mayor Lucho Gárzon, the most popular political figure next to the president. "The reelection bill was made for Uribe," said Fernando Giraldo, the dean of political science at Bogotá's Javeriana University. "Reelection isn't a response to a maturation of the democratic system, but the result of political circumstances." Furthermore, the bill is designed to expire in 2014, four years after Uribe would finish a second term. If Uribe really believed that two-term presidents were a way of fortifying the central government and defeating the FARC, he would have fought to permanently change the constitution.

Like many critics of reelection, Giraldo argues that Colombia already has an excessively strong presidency—without the counterweights of more developed democracies like the United States. Here, most things can be accomplished by presidential decree; if Congress doesn't pass the budget in time, for instance, the president can simply mandate one. Allowing the president to serve a second four-year term would only further distort the inequality, says Giraldo. And Uribe already exhibits a troubling tendency to overstep his bounds as chief executive. Take the recent example of the capture of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda in Venezuela. Instead of going through legal channels, Uribe chose to pay greedy Venezuelan officials to nab Granda in Caracas and dump him over the border in Colombia, where he was arrested. The resulting crisis was the worst break in diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Colombia in recent history.

AS IT STANDS now, Uribe will have a host of unfair advantages heading into 2006. Critics accuse him of altering policy decisions and trading diplomatic posts for narrow political gain. Over strong objections from opposition parties in congress, Uribe agreed to increase social spending in order to nab crucial support from the Conservative Party. (Uribe, a former member of the Liberal Party, has no party of his own in Congress to count on.)

Two Conservative congressmen were won over with personal rewards in now-infamous episodes. In another incident, Vice President Francisco Santos offered to leave the 2006 ticket in favor of Conservative Party President Carlos Holguín. Now Holguín's son, Carlos Holguín Sardi, has been nominated ambassador to Ecuador. Uribe has appointed dozens of siblings, aunts, daughters, and sons of congressmen to ambassadorial posts, although the public outcry over the practice recently became so bad that Uribe was forced to announce that he would halt the practice.

Uribe will enjoy plenty of other advantages over potential opponents in his reelection bid. There is no guaranteed financing for campaigns, nor is there equal access to the media to compete with the notorious community councils. The election rules are to be determined in debates now taking place in the Uribe-friendly congress. Frustrated opponents are left to sit and watch from the sidelines. "The competition between Uribe and others is going to be very unequal," lamented Senator Carlos Gaviria, who is running against Uribe from the left. "In the United States, the opposition is much more respected and it has a lot more guarantees."

Influential ex-President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen—outraged that Uribe might attempt to seek reelection even if the Constitutional Court declares the amendment allowing him to run for a second term invalid—has called for the formation of an anti-Uribe coalition. Gaviria says that, if the left doesn't warm to Michelsen's suggestion and unite behind a single candidate in the 2006 elections, defeating Uribe will be difficult. "If there isn't unity, defeating Uribe seems a little bit less than impossible," Gaviria said. The decline of Colombian democracy, however, will seem more probable than ever. ■

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

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

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Realtors v. the Internet. Home Page

BY CLAY RISEN

THE WASHINGTON, D.C., headquarters of the National Association of Realtors (NAR) sits on a narrow, triangular plot at the intersection of New Jersey Avenue and First Street, just a few blocks northwest of the Capitol. Completed in October, the twelve-story tower is wrapped in a curtain of blue-green glass; standing across the street, one notices less the building than the sharpness with which it reflects its surroundings. And it is so narrow that, looking back at it from the intersection of New Jersey and Massachusetts Avenues, a few blocks north, one barely notices anything at all. It practically disappears—hidden in plain sight.

The same could be said for NAR itself. On one level, the Association's Washington presence is enormous. It is the second-largest political donor of all time, behind the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, but well ahead of such better-known campaign heavyweights as the trial lawyers, the Teamsters, and the National Education Association. But, unlike other lobbies, which work to ensure friendly legislation, NAR focuses its Washington efforts on ensuring that no federal legislation affecting its members passes in the first place—and that what regulation exists occurs at the state level, where local realtors exercise significant control over real estate commissions. By and large, rules governing the real estate industry are set by the Association itself. There is no real estate equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Instead, there is only NAR—lobbyist and rule-making body all in one.

NAR was founded in 1908 to crack down on fraudulent brokers by creating a standardized set of industry rules. But, over the years, it has evolved from consumer advocate to status quo bulwark, the first line of defense for an enormously profitable commission structure that nets realtors more than $60 billion a year from residential sales. Thanks to NAR, the way homes are bought and sold in the United States has changed little since the Eisenhower administration. But, today, realtors face a new challenge: the Internet. In the late '90s, the Web radically transformed one sector of the economy after another, from travel to stocks, shifting control from the middlemen to consumers. But, in part because of NAR's power, real estate has been a holdout. In recent years, however, the old system, in which realtors tightly controlled home listings, searches, and buying, has been confronted by a series of alternative models embodied by such companies as eRealty, ZipRealty, and LendingTree. Experts predict that these new Internet-based business models could cut commission costs in half, saving consumers $30 billion per year. But the counterattack has been as swift as it was predictable: Under industry pressure, NAR has developed a series of rules designed, at least implicitly, to shut newcomers out of the market and make sure the Internet reinforces, rather than undermines, the status quo.

NAR has beaten back similar challenges in the past. But, this time, its efforts have begun raising eyebrows in Washington. The Justice Department has three separate actions underway; meanwhile, Representative Mike Oxley, the Republican chair of the Financial Services Committee, has requested a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on real estate practices, hinting that he would hold hearings after its completion. Taken together, the possibility for federal intervention in the real estate market has never been higher. The last major unregulated market in the United States may soon come to an end—and that's good news for business and consumers.

ACCORDING TO THE traditional model, if you want to sell your home, you go to a realtor, who takes down information about the house and posts it to the region's Multiple Listing Service (MLS), a compendium of local homes for sale, paid for and maintained by participating local realtors (there are about 800 MLSs nationwide). Buyers, through their own realtors, can then peruse the MLS. When a sale is closed, typically the seller pays his realtor a fixed percentage—usually 6 percent—that the seller's realtor then splits with the buyer's realtor. It's an innovative scheme, and one that has worked well since it emerged in its modern form after World War II. "Can you think of any other industry where individual owners share inventory in order to sell more?" asks Blanche Evans, a columnist for *Realty Times*. But the flip side to this cooperation is a system of casual collusion; realtors who offer lower commissions often find their houses passed over by other realtors, blackballed for violating the real estate omerta. "The upside is they agree, but the downside is also that they agree," says Brad Inman, a real estate journalist and editor of *Inman News*, another real estate news service. "[The MLS makes] it harder for innovative, alternative business models to crack the code."

In pre-Internet days, the MLS was a thick book updated regularly, but today, it is an electronic database. This has led some entrepreneurs to challenge the system, figuring that, instead of spending time sitting down with each client to search the MLS, they could just give them access to it directly through a website. That way the buyer could have more control over what they see, while realtors, needing less time for each client, could handle more of them. In fact, with drastically lower costs per transaction, such online operations could even offer discounted commissions—as low as 3 percent total (for a savings of about $4,500 on a $150,000 home). The logical conclusion is the Virtual Office Website (VOW), in which buyers and sellers are matched online. "We're a real estate firm," says Eric Danziger, the president and CEO of one such firm, ZipRealty. "But we're as different from tradi-

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tional real estate in terms of how we operate as Amazon was from Borders and Barnes and Noble." Some firms also offer à la carte options, in which consumers can pick and choose which services they would like a realtor to provide; the fewer the services, the cheaper the bill. A variation on the Internet real estate model is LendingTree: Similar to its system for matching customers looking for loans with lenders online, in 2000, LendingTree set up a website where prospective buyers and sellers register an online profile—location, price, number of bedrooms, and so on—after which buyers can peruse the MLS; meanwhile, LendingTree sends the profile to its network of realtors, who then bid for each customer's business. LendingTree gets a referral fee, part of which it uses to cover a rebate that it sends its customers (usually about $2,000).

At the root of these new models is not just an operational transformation, but a paradigmatic one as well. For almost 100 years, the industry has looked at listings—the basic unit of all real estate transactions—as the product of the realtors themselves. "The sellers don't own their listings," says NAR's vice president for public relations, Steve Cook. "The data did not exist before the broker." According to NAR, that makes the MLS—and regulation of it—a business-to-business issue, in which consumer concerns matter little, if at all. "You do not get to walk into Neiman Marcus and try on dresses in the stockroom," Evans says. "The MLS is the stockroom. The rest is presentation."

But the Internet, by giving consumers easy access to information, changes that calculation radically. In a 2003 paper they wrote on the real estate market for the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), policy analysts Shane Ham and Robert Atkinson argued that the Internet should "enable buyers and sellers to make choices for themselves instead of having those choices dictated to them by powerful forces in the industry."

Those powerful forces are, namely, Cendant and RE/MAX, two companies that together control roughly 40 percent of the national real estate market and can therefore exert tremendous pressure on MLSs, state real estate boards, and NAR (RE/MAX is a household name, but Cendant is better known through its many subsidiaries, which include both Century 21 and Coldwell Banker). In February 2003, Cendant released a white paper calling for immediate action against the wave of VOWs, and, in particular, such network-based models as LendingTree. Soon after, NAR finalized a set of VOW rules that, among other things, gave companies like Cendant and RE/MAX enormous power to retaliate against rebellious brokerages. The centerpiece of the new regulations is something known as an "opt-out" rule: Broker A may now ban Broker B from displaying A's listings on B's website, even though those listings are in the MLS. Cook admits that the opt-out rule was included as a concession to the two industry heavyweights. "Cendant and RE/MAX said they would not cooperate without broker opt-out. In a sense, we had the concern that the whole MLS was at risk, that they would create their own database," he says.

The old-line brokerages are fighting back at the state level as well, where they have enormous influence. "Many of the state commissioners are de facto appointees of the real estate board," Inman says. Twelve states have already passed laws banning rebates, even though they are allowed in similar industries. And several states are contemplating rules that require brokers to be full-service operations, effectively outlawing the à la carte options in which many online brokers specialize.

The NAR argues that VOWs are too small a portion of the market to merit government concern. But that's circular reasoning—VOWs are a small part of the equation not because they aren't viable models, but because NAR has created an unfriendly market environment. "In this case, the competitor writes the rules," says Atkinson, director of the Technology and New Economy Project at PPI, "so it's very risky for these start-ups, because the people who control their fate are their competitors."

Washington is starting to agree. In March, the Justice Department sued the Kentucky Real Estate Commission over its rebate ban, and, on April 8, it warned the Oklahoma legislature not to pass a bill restricting à la carte brokerages. This is on top of an ongoing investigation into industry competition nationwide. The attention is leading some experts to wonder whether real estate shouldn't have an SEC-like oversight agency. Indeed, combined with GAO's upcoming report and possible congressional hearings, these actions point out that, by trying to stamp out Internet competition, NAR may have jeopardized its once-unassailable control over its industry—and made radical change more, not less, likely.

CALLING FOR AN SEC-like oversight body for real estate may be a bit premature; the Justice Department may yet find that it has the power to rein in the industry itself. But what is clear is that the feds need to recognize the difficulty that innovative models have entering the real estate market. "Absent smart, new public policies, e-transformation of the real estate industry will be extremely slow, costing consumers hundreds of billions of dollars," wrote Ham and Atkinson.

If federal regulation does emerge, real estate could go through a change much like the airline industry in the 1980s and '90s—a massive shakeup that led to the emergence of the discount airline sector and a steep drop in ticket prices. In that case, it was deregulation, not increased oversight, that made the difference. But, in both cases, federal action was necessary to eliminate the anti-competitive practices of a few industry heavyweights. It's an analogy not lost on those challenging the Cendant-RE/MAX behemoth. "The big brands in real estate that dominate the market, I often refer to them as Eastern Airlines and PanAm," says ZipRealty's Danziger. "Both were dominant. No one would have dreamt that they could go away. But they didn't listen to the customer. That's possible in real estate as well. Either do a better job or lose out." And, either way, thanks to increased federal attention, consumers should win. ■

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How fundamentalism is splitting the GOP.

Crisis of Faith

BY ANDREW SULLIVAN

"In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem."
—Ronald Reagan, January 20, 1981

"We have a responsibility that, when somebody hurts, government has got to move."
—George W. Bush, September 1, 2003

CONSERVATISM ISN'T OVER. But it has rarely been as confused. Today's conservatives support limited government. But they believe the federal government can intervene in a state court's decisions in a single family's struggle over life and death. They believe in restraining government spending. But they have increased such spending by a mind-boggling 33 percent in a mere four years. They believe in self-reliance. But they have just passed the most expensive new entitlement since the heyday of Great Society liberalism: the Medicare prescription-drug benefit. They believe that foreign policy is about the pursuit of national interest and that the military should be used only to fight and win wars. Yet they have embarked on an extraordinarily ambitious program of military-led nation-building in the Middle East. They believe in states' rights, but they want to amend the Constitution to forbid any state from allowing civil marriage or equivalent civil unions for gay couples. They believe in free trade. But they have imposed tariffs on a number of industries, most famously steel. They believe in balanced budgets. But they have abandoned fiscal discipline and added a cool trillion dollars to the national debt in one presidential term.

One reason for conservatism's endurance in the face of such contradiction, of course, is the extreme weakness—intellectual and organizational—of the opposition. Liberalism ceased being a vibrant force in the American public weal two decades ago. The left never recovered from the collapse of communism, the dismal failure of social democracy across Western Europe, and the demise of Japan's command economy in the 1980s. Domestically, a liberal claim on the presidency never recovered from Jimmy Carter and the first two years of Bill Clinton. Conservatism, broadly understood, has occupied the White House for 23 of the past 25 years. No unreconstructed liberal stands a chance of winning it in the near future—hence Hillary Clinton's moderate makeover.

Conservatism has endured also because it slowly absorbed much of the old liberal spirit. Who, after all, are the most vocal moral crusaders of today? Christian conservatives, who deploy government power against all sorts of perceived wrongs—sexual trafficking, AIDS in Africa, gay unions, poor parenting, teen sex, indecent television, and euthanasia, among many. Almost no Democrat speaks with the moral conviction of religious Republicans. And, when liberalism has been outrun on moral fervor, precious little oxygen remains to revive it—especially with austere, patrician leaders like John Kerry and Al Gore or angry pop culture ranters like Michael Moore.

But conservatism's very incoherence may be one reason for its endurance. In its long road to victory, the Republican Party has regularly preferred the promise of power to the satisfaction of schism. It has long been pro-government and anti-government. It has contained Rockefeller and Goldwater, Nixon and Reagan, Bush I and Bush II. As a governing philosophy, it has been able to tack for decades from statism to laissez-faire, from big government to individual freedom, with only occasional discomfort. Conservatism's resilience has been a function of its internal ideological diversity and balance. The more closely you look, however, the deeper the division has become in the last few years, intensifying dramatically since last fall's election. Which is why, this time, the balancing act may finally be coming undone.

LET ME BE rash and describe the fundamental divide within conservatism as a battle between two rival forms. The two forms I'm referring to are ideal types. I know very few conservatives who fit completely into one camp or the other; and these camps do not easily comport with the categories we have become used to deploying—categories like "libertarian," "social conservative," "paleoconservative," "fiscal conservative and social liberal," and so on. There is, I think, a deeper rift, and a more fundamental one.

Call one the conservatism of faith and the other the conservatism of doubt. They have co-existed in the past but are becoming less and less compatible as the conservative ascendancy matures. Start with the type now dominant in Republican discourse: the conservatism of faith. This conservatism states conservative principles—and, indeed, eternal insights into the human condition—as a matter of truth. Because these conservatives believe that the individual is inseparable from her political community and civilization, there can be no government neutrality in promoting such truths. Either a government's laws affirm virtue or they affirm vice. And the meaning of virtue and vice can be understood either by reflecting on the Judeo-Christian moral

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

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tradition or by inferring from philosophical understandings what human nature in its finest form should be. These truths are not culturally relative; they are universally valid.

The state, therefore, has a duty to protect, at a minimum, all human life, meaning it must regulate abortion and end-of-life decisions. The conservatism of faith sees nothing wrong with channeling $2 billion of public money to religious charities, as the Bush administration boasts; or with spending government money to promote sexual abstinence as a moral good; or with telling parents in government literature that a gay child may need therapy. Science must be hedged by faith, as the teaching of evolution is questioned and pharmacists are allowed to refuse prescriptions for contraception on religious grounds. And public education must have a moral component. As President Bush said in his first State of the Union, "Values are important, so we have tripled funding for character education to teach our children not only reading and writing, but right from wrong." The "we" referred to here is the federal government. The alternative, in the eyes of faith-conservatives, would be to allow those with a different morality to promote a rival agenda. Since neutrality is impossible, conservative truths trump secular values.

What matters to conservatives of faith is therefore less the size of government than its meaning and structure. If it is harnessed to uphold their definition of the good life—protecting a stable family structure, upholding Biblical morality, protecting the vulnerable—then its size is irrelevant, as long as it doesn't overwhelm civil society. Indeed, using government to promote certain activities (the proper care of children, support for the poor, legal privileges for heterosexual relationships) and to deter others (recreational drug use, divorce, gay unions, abortion, indecent television) is integral to the conservative project. Bush has added another twist to this philosophy, seeking not only to expand government programs from the top down, but from the bottom up, by incorporating new mechanisms that give citizens more choice. Hence Health Savings Accounts in Medicare and personal accounts within Social Security. If that actually means more government borrowing and spending, so be it. If government must be expanded to give more people a sense of "ownership" within government programs, fine. This is what remains of conservatism's old belief in individual freedom. The new conservatism of faith has substituted real choice in a free market for regulated choice within an ever-expanding welfare state.

There is nothing especially new about this kind of conservatism. Bismarck and Disraeli pioneered it in Europe in the nineteenth century, using imperial foreign policy, domestic paternalism, and religious piety to cement new majorities. In the United States, it has less of a pedigree, because the power of the federal government was historically far more restrained than in Europe. But the use of government to impose morality is obviously an old American theme—whether in the abolitionist or temperance campaigns, or even, to some extent, in Jim Crow laws and the civil rights movement. A country that has amended its Constitution to forbid drinking alcohol is no stranger to big-government conservatism.

Of course, it is equally true that, since Franklin Roosevelt vastly expanded the federal government, conservatism has been associated with resistance to its power rather than encouragement of its deployment. The conservative wing of the GOP backed states' rights against civil rights. Conservatives opposed the New Deal. Ronald Reagan equated Medicare with the end of American freedom. The difference today is that acceptance of big government has not meant mere acquiescence in the liberal orthodoxy, but a conscious attempt to use government for moral ends. As Republicans found that it was hard to reduce the size of government, they decided to stop worrying and deploy it for their own goals.

As a result, Republicans now support institutions they previously vilified: Whereas they once wanted to abolish the federal Department of Education, now they want to wield it to advance their own agenda on educational standards and morals (no wonder that, in four years, Bush has doubled—yes, doubled—its budget). They are willing to concern themselves with aspects of human life that conservatives once believed should be free of all government interference. In his 2003 State of the Union speech, Bush said, "I propose a $450 million initiative to bring mentors to more than a million disadvantaged junior high students and children of prisoners. ... I propose a new $600 million program to help an additional 300,000 Americans receive [drug] treatment over the next three years." And the conservative movement, begun partially in resistance to federal intervention in what was regarded as the states' spheres of influence, today has endorsed dramatic federal supremacy over state prerogatives. The No Child Left Behind Act entailed a massive transfer of power from states to the federal government—not just a difference from Reagan-era conservatism, but its opposite.

No wonder the size of government has exploded. The federal government now spends around $22,000 per household per year—up from a little under $19,000 in 2000. Total government spending has increased by an astonishing 33 percent since 2000. This isn't all about post–September 11 defense and homeland security. According to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, since 2001, federal spending on housing and commerce has jumped 86 percent, community and regional development 71 percent, and Medicaid some 46 percent. One of Bush's closest confidants and longtime chief of staff, Andy Card, described the president's own vision of his role as president: "It struck me as I was speaking to people in Bangor, Maine, that this president sees America as we think about a ten-year-old child. ... I know, as a parent, I would sacrifice all for my children." In Bush's case, paternalism isn't a metaphor. It's a commitment worth trillions of dollars of other people's money.

The single most influential architect of this conservatism, Karl Rove, sees this as a virtue, not a problem. In a recent

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speech to conservative activists, according to John Heilemann of *New York* magazine, "Rove rejected the party's 'reactionary' and 'pessimistic' past, in which it stood idly by while 'liberals were setting the pace of change and had the visionary goals.' Now, he went on, the GOP has seized the 'mantle of idealism,' dedicating itself to 'putting government on the side of progress and reform, modernization and greater freedom.' " The model for Rove's conservatism, in other words, is liberalism. The difference is merely how government directs its vast power, and for whom. In some cases, where the conservatism of faith seeks to use government power to protect the weak, it is indistinguishable from liberalism. It is no accident, I think, that left-liberals like Jesse Jackson and Ralph Nader embraced the cause of Bush's federal intervention in the Terri Schiavo case. And it is equally no accident that sincere internationalist liberals see much to admire in Bush's hyper-liberal foreign policy, or that long-standing campaigners for action against HIV/AIDS in the developing world have been pleasantly surprised by his activism and generosity. The fact that the president almost never publicly worries about levels of public spending and debt is also music to traditionally liberal ears. Only bitterness has prevented many on the left from seeing that this administration is on their side on many issues. Or, perhaps, that this president has brilliantly co-opted liberal rhetoric for big-government conservatism.

WHAT OTHER KIND of conservatism is there? The alternative philosophical tradition begins in precise opposition to the new conservatives' confidence in faith and reason as direct, accessible routes to universal truth. The conservatism of doubt asks how anyone can be sure that his view of what is moral or good is actually true. Conservatives of doubt note that even the most dogmatic of institutions, such as the Catholic or Mormon churches, have changed their views over many centuries, and that, even within such institutions, there is considerable debate about difficult moral issues. They understand that significant critiques of human reason—Nietzsche, anyone?—have rendered the philosophical quest for self-evident truth even more precarious in the modern world. Such conservatives are not nihilists or devotees of what Pope Benedict XVI has called "the dictatorship of relativism." They merely believe that the purported choice between moral absolutism and complete relativism, between God and moral anarchy, is a phony one. Their alternative is a skeptical, careful, prudential approach to all moral questions—and suspicion of anyone claiming to hold the absolute truth. Since such an approach rarely provides a simple answer persuasive to everyone within a democratic society, we live with moral and cultural pluralism.

For conservatives of faith, such pluralism can allow error to flourish—and immorality to become government policy—and therefore must be limited. A conservative of doubt, however, does not regard the existence of such pluralism as a problem. He sees it as an unavoidable fact of modernity, an invitation to lives that are more challenging and autonomous than in more traditional societies. Even when conservatives of doubt disagree with others' moral convictions, they recognize that, in a free, pluralist society, those other views deserve a hearing. So a conservative who believes abortion is always immoral can reconcile herself to a polity in which abortion is still legal, if regulated. Putting government power unequivocally on the side of one view of morality—especially in extremely controversial areas—must always be balanced against the rights and views of citizens who dissent. And, precisely because complete government neutrality may be impossible on these issues, government should tread as lightly as possible. The key in areas of doubt is to do as little harm as possible. Which often means, with respect to government power, doing as little as possible.

Doubt, in other words, means restraint. And restraint of government is the indispensable foundation of human freedom. The modern liberal European state was founded on such doubt. In the seventeenth century, men like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke looked at the consequences of various faiths battling for control of the moralizing state—and they balked. They saw civil war, religious extremism, torture, burnings at the stake, police states, and the Inquisition. They saw polities like Great Britain's ravaged by sectarian squabbles over what the truth is, how it is discovered, and how to impose it on a society as a whole. And they made a fundamental break with ancient and medieval political thought by insisting that government retreat from such areas—that it leave the definition of the good life to private citizens, to churches uncontaminated by government, or to universities that would seek and discuss competing views of the truth.

In the modern world, where disagreement among citizens is even deeper and more diverse than three centuries ago, conservatives of doubt see their tradition as more necessary than ever. As the fusion of religious fundamentalism with politics has destroyed Muslim society and politics, so, these conservatives fear, it threatens Western freedom as well—in subtler, milder, Christian forms. Conservatives of doubt are not necessarily atheists or amoralists. Many are devout Christians who embrace a strong separation of church and state—for the sake of religion as much as politics. Others may be Oakeshottian skeptics, or Randian individualists, or Burkean pragmatists, or libertarian idealists. But they all agree that the only solution to deep social disagreement is not a forced supremacy of a majority or minority, but an attempt to keep government as neutral as possible, power as close to people as possible, and as much economic power in the hands of the private sector as possible.

For such conservatives, divided government is therefore critical. Judicial checks on democratic majorities are as vital as legislative checks on executive abuse. (They are just as queasy removing such parliamentary checks as the filibuster.) The same goes for keeping policy-making as close as possible to states and localities. Why? Because human knowledge is fallible, and those closest to the issues are

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more likely to get solutions right than people a long way away. The notion that the federal government should actively endorse one religion's perspective on social policy would appall such conservatives. So would the idea that individual states cannot legitimately experiment with policies on which there is no national consensus—such as stem-cell research or marriage rights.

Such conservatives are delighted at Bush's tax cuts in principle. But they also doubt whether financing them entirely by borrowing is a real tax cut. If you do not cut spending by the same amount (or almost the same amount) as you have cut taxes, you are merely postponing a fiscal reckoning. Conservatives of doubt question the faith of supply-side economics, where all economic tradeoffs are banished. They suspect that either the government will have to raise taxes at some point to pay off its debts or it will have to devalue its currency, or allow inflation. The chances of an administration tackling government spending after endorsing it enthusiastically for four years strikes these conservatives as unlikely. Hence their disillusion with Bush. They worry that this president has effectively granted legitimacy to vast areas of government power that the left will soon seize on to consolidate the welfare state and raise taxes under the banner of debt-reduction.



Conservative of doubt.

This ever-expanding entitlement state offends conservatives of doubt as deeply as the theo-conservative religious state. Their reasoning? At any given moment, wealth that is absorbed by the government is not available to individuals. The more of a country's wealth the government controls, the less freedom for that country's citizens. For a conservative of doubt, the market is a much more reliable indicator of how individuals actually want to live their lives than a government directive or program. Why? Again, the argument rests on an understanding of human wisdom. Since error is inevitable in human choice, better to lessen the chances for those errors to be magnified and compounded by one predominant actor—the government. The more dispersed power is, the less chance for catastrophe.

Is this conservatism philosophically strong enough to endure? Rich Lowry of *National Review* recently argued that it is not: "The secularist view misses that freedom is grounded in truths, in the God-given dignity of man as a rational creature and in our fundamental equality. This is why the pope could say, 'God created us to be free.' If the idea of freedom is detached from these truths, it has no secure ground, because the strong will inevitably attempt to dominate the weak unless checked by moral truths (see slavery or segregation or communism)." Without Christianity, Lowry argues, the rights of the individual will be trampled. But what if Lowry's fellow citizen is an atheist? How can the atheist be persuaded to consent to truths that are only solidly grounded in a faith he doesn't share? And what happens when even those who share the same faith disagree profoundly on its moral and political consequences? Lowry seems to forget that men of Christian faith strongly opposed *and* backed slavery and segregation—and used Biblical texts to do so.

The defense of human freedom offered by conservatives of doubt, on the other hand, is founded on more accessible and less contentious arguments. Such conservatives can point to the Constitution itself as the basis of U.S. political life, and its Enlightenment concept of freedom as sturdy enough without extra-Constitutional theology. (The purpose of the Constitution was to preserve the Declaration of Independence's right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." The word "virtue" is not included in that phrase. Its omission is the single greatest innovation of the U.S. founding.) They can point to the astonishing success and durability of the U.S. experiment to buttress the notion that the Constitution is a much more stable defense of human equality than that inherent in any religion. The Constitution itself has far wider support among citizens than any theological argument. To put it another way: You don't need an actual religion when you already have a workable civil version in place.

What, though, happens to moral appeals in politics? They do not disappear, especially in a place as deeply religious as the United States. But they express themselves in crusades for personal salvation, evangelism, or social work, rather than in legislative change. Compare President George H.W. Bush's praise for "a thousand points of light" as a critical voluntary complement to the welfare state with George W. Bush's channeling of public money into religious social programs. The one is premised on a conser-

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vatism of doubt; the second on a conservatism of faith. In that sense, the new conservatism seems to believe that faith communities cannot do their work adequately without government help. It has less faith in faith than conservatives of doubt do.

FOR THE LAST few decades, enough has united conservatives of doubt and conservatives of faith to keep the coalition in one rickety piece. Both groups were passionately anti-communist, even if there were some disagreements on strategy and tactics. Today, both groups are just as hostile to Islamist terrorism and fundamentalism. Both groups have historically backed lower taxes. Both oppose affirmative action and gun control. And there have been conservative personalities who have managed to appeal to both sides—Ronald Reagan is the exemplar.

Conservatism is stronger for containing both traditions. The contribution of Christianity to Western notions of human freedom is indisputable, and conservatives of doubt have no desire to minimize that fact. Similarly, conservative Christians have historically been aware of the need for limited government in order to protect the very freedoms that allow their faith to flourish. Besides, the West has long alternated between periods that emphasized the need for collective moral action and those that demanded smaller government and greater individual freedom. Conservatism's diverse philosophical pedigree has allowed it to adapt and endure as a political philosophy.



Conservative of faith.

KEVIN DIETSCH/UPI PHOTO/LANDOV

In the last part of the twentieth century, conservatism in Great Britain and the United States threaded both needles, dramatically increasing individual economic freedom through lower taxes, while retaining respect for moral tradition and stability for family structure and individual responsibility. You might describe Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as people who, in a collectivist age, had faith in the conservatism of doubt. But, as this wave of conservatism ratcheted back government power, and, as left-of-center parties—Bill Clinton's Democrats and Tony Blair's New Labour—all but acquiesced to the new order, the right's intellectual energy sought new projects. Conservatism had won much in the 1990s, even as liberal parties ruled: Taxes were not raised to anything like the levels of the past; fiscal discipline became entrenched; issues like tackling welfare and crime found their way to the liberal wing of the Anglo-American political spectrum.

What, then, was the right to do? In Great Britain, it has hewed to the center-right and failed to unseat an essentially center-right government under Blair. It has endorsed marginally lower taxes, but essentially reconciled itself to Blair's incremental increase in government and the social liberalization of the past 30 years. (Compared with Bush's spending habits, Blair is a Thatcherite.) In the United States, however, conservatives of faith saw their opportunity and reversed many years of limited government philosophy in order to install a bigger, more morally attuned, more powerful government.

AT THE SAME time, the nature and content of the faith of these post-millennial conservatives changed. It was no longer that of mainstream Protestantism or even of most American Catholics. It was a version of faith that was resurgent around the world as the new millennium passed: a fundamentalist and authoritarian revival that took hold in all the major religions. And it was this fundamentalism that made the new faith-conservatism more radical and far-reaching than in the past. It kept the radical edge of conservatism razor-sharp.

Fundamentalism, by its very nature, eschews compromise. It is not an inferential philosophy, drawing on experience or history to come to a conclusion about the appropriate way to act or legislate on any given issue. It derives its purpose from fixed texts: the Bible or the Koran. In its Catholic form, it vests unalterable authority in the Pope rather than in the more heterodox laity or even broader clergy, and it brooks no internal dissent or debate. Because the tenets of fundamentalism are inviolable and its standards are mandatory, fundamentalists are inevitably uneasy in the modern West. The culture affronts them in every way—and the affront demands a response. Women in combat? Against God's will. Same-sex marriage? An oxymoron. Abortion? Always and everywhere to be forbidden by law. Stem-cell research on embryos? Doctor Mengele reborn.

The idea that there can be prudential compromises on issues like the right to die, or same-sex marriage, or stem-

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cell research is a difficult one for fundamentalists. Since there is no higher authority than God, and, since there can be no higher priority than obeying him, the entire notion of separating politics and religion is inherently troublesome to the fundamentalist mind. Whereas for older types of faith-conservatives, religion informed their view of the world and shaped the way they entered civil discourse, the new conservatives of faith bring their religious tenets, unmediated, into the public square.

Two recent controversies highlight this new stridency. The Schiavo case revealed something profound about the new conservatism. Old conservatives would have been reluctant to intervene politically in a horrifying family dispute. They would have been comfortable letting local courts or state law govern the case. And they would have acquiesced to due process, whatever qualms they might have had about the details. Today's fundamentalists, by contrast, could see little nuance in the Schiavo case: scant concern for family prerogatives, state law, judicial review, and all other painstaking proceduralism. The fundamental truth for them was that Schiavo was being murdered. A woman who had been in a persistent vegetative state for 15 years was, for some, indistinguishable from a healthy adult. Some thought her husband's legal rights were rendered less germane by his allegedly sinful private life. The state legislature, governor, and then the federal Congress were cajoled to intervene. The president flew back to Washington to sign legislation designed for one specific case. If there was once a balance between conservatives of doubt and conservatives of faith, that balance was abandoned. It was abandoned as conservatives of faith morphed into conservatives of fundamentalism.

The fundamentalist conservatives were able to corral the most powerful people in the Republican Party to do their will. The major organs of conservative opinion—*The Weekly Standard*, *National Review*—both backed the fundamentalist position. The *Standard* published a long essay arguing that, even if Schiavo had signed a living will citing her desire to be allowed to die if she succumbed to a permanent vegetative state, she should have been kept alive indefinitely. Morality trumped autonomy. Indeed, the whole notion of individual autonomy was deemed a threat to what conservatism was seeking to defend. The judge in the Schiavo case was vilified, along with the rest of the judiciary. House majority leader Tom DeLay promised retribution against the judges who ruled in the case. Senator John Cornyn made a speech, which he subsequently retracted in part, saying that decisions like the Schiavo ruling made violence against judges more understandable. Conservatives at a conference in Washington, D.C., called Justice Anthony Kennedy's jurisprudence "satanic." James Dobson, arguably the most powerful evangelical leader in the United States, compared the Supreme Court to the Ku Klux Klan. A religious right conference baldly declared that the Democratic Party was fighting a war against all "people of faith." It was blessed by the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist.

On same-sex marriage, conservatives of faith have been equally uncompromising. In response to several court cases across the country that edged closer and closer to giving legal equality to gays and lesbians, conservatives in Washington responded by proposing—as a first resort—a constitutional amendment prohibiting marriage and any of its benefits from being granted to same-sex couples. Again, what's interesting is just how far-reaching the initial position was. Several other conservative positions were ruled out in advance: that marriage is a conservative institution that should include gays; that states should be allowed to figure out their own marriage policies as they have done for decades; that no action need be taken as long as the Defense of Marriage Act remained on the books, preventing one state's marriages from being foisted on another; or that conservatives could support civil unions or halfway measures that could grant gays some, but not all, of the rights of heterosexual marriage.

In various state constitutional amendments, again actively promoted by the Republican Party, gay couples were also denied benefits or protections. Judges—some liberal, many conservative—were described as "activists" or "extremists" if they applied their state constitution's guarantees of equal protection to gay couples. The rhetoric was extraordinary. Letting gays marry was equated with the "abolition" of marriage, even though no one was proposing to change heterosexual marriage rights one iota. "Homosexuals ... want to destroy the institution of marriage," James Dobson said. "It will destroy the Earth."

How were conservatives of doubt supposed to respond to these fundamentalist incursions into the conservative discourse? A few dissented. The Schiavo case seemed finally to embolden traditional conservatives into defending due process and limited government. (Some are even defending the filibuster as an essential tool for limited and divided government.) But they failed to blunt the fundamentalist position within the Republican Party or to dilute the venomous attacks on the judiciary that followed. On the marriage issue, even those with openly gay offspring, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, were forced to toe the party line. The religious right's insistence that homosexuality is a psychological disease requiring treatment forced the president to avoid ever using the words "gay" or "lesbian" or "homosexual" in his speeches; even recognizing the existence of gay citizens was too much for the social right. No surprise, then, that the 2004 Republican Party platform called for constitutional amendments banning all legal benefits and protections for gay couples everywhere in the United States. In a society with a big openly gay population, this was not a politics of moderation. It was and is a crusade.

Crusades, however, are not means of persuasion. They are means of coercion. And so it is no accident that the crusading Republicans are impatient with institutional obstacles in their way. The judiciary, which is designed to check executive and legislative decisions, is now the first object of attack. Bare-knuckled character assassination of oppo-

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nents is part of the repertoire: Just look at the swift-boat smears of John Kerry. The filibuster is attacked. The mass media is targeted, not simply to correct bad or biased reporting, but to promote points of view that are openly sectarian, even if, as in the case of Armstrong Williams, you have to pay for people to endorse your views. Religious right dominance of the party machinery, in an electoral landscape remade by gerrymandering, means that few opponents of fundamentalist politics have a future in the Republican Party. It's telling that none of the biggest talents in the Republican Party will ever be its nominee for president. John McCain, Arnold Schwarzenegger, George Pataki, and Rudy Giuliani could never survive the fundamentalist-dominated primaries.

Indeed, by their very nature, conservatives of doubt are not particularly aggressive politicians. Fiscal conservatives have been coy in expressing their outrage at Bush's massive spending and borrowing, easily silenced by the thought that Democrats would be even worse. Defenders of an independent judiciary are drowned out by the talk radio/Fox News/blog–driven megaphone of loathing for unaccountable judges. Many moderate conservatives voted for the law to protect Schiavo. Republican defenders of gay marriage are few and far between. Those few voices of dissent are increasingly portrayed as mavericks or has-beens. You will find precious little time for people like Christie Todd Whitman on talk radio or in the conservative blogosphere.

BUT THAT DOESN'T mean that the arguments of doubt-conservatism are flimsy or unnecessary. In fact, they may be increasingly critical to conservatism's survival. An ideologically polarized country, in which one party uses big government for its own moral purposes and the other wields it for its own, is not one that can long maintain a civil discourse. Politics becomes war, letting a key Republican leader like DeLay can genially boast that his supporters are armed. What conservatism has long offered is a messy defense of procedure and moderation, doubt and limits, attributes that make civilized politics possible and are often appreciated only when they are lost. But, by then, it is sometimes too late.

I'm not saying that Republicanism is headed for an institutional crack-up. What I am saying is that, unless the religious presence within Republicanism becomes less dogmatic and fundamentalist, the conservative coalition as we have known it cannot long endure. Advocates for government restraint cannot, in good conscience, keep supporting a party that believes in its own God-given mission to change people's souls. Believers in fiscal discipline cannot keep backing an administration that boasts of its huge spending increases and has no intention of changing. Those inclined to prudence cannot join forces with fanatics (at least not in times when national security doesn't hang in the balance). Retreating to the Democrats is not an option. Small government conservatives are even less powerful within the opposition's base than in the GOP's. Bill Clinton's small-c conservatism was made possible only by what now looks like a blessed interaction with a Republican Congress. The only pragmatic option is to persuade those who run the Republican Party that religious zeal is a highly unstable base for conservative politics: It is divisive, inflammatory, and intolerant of the very mechanisms that keep freedom alive.

This doesn't mean purging Christians from the GOP. It means filtering religious faith through the skeptical and moderate strands of conservative thought. It means replacing zeal with religious humility; it means accepting that trading compromise of religious principles for political compromise is an ineluctable and vital democratic task. It means a lower temperature within conservative circles on issues like abortion, stem-cell research, and gay rights. And it means a renewed commitment to restraining government from its democratic instinct to act too often, too quickly, and too expensively.

But that is not the prime reason for standing up for the conservatism of doubt in a time of religious certainty. Imagine if the Rove formula is actually a successful one. Imagine a dominant political party devoted to expanding government as a means of moral revival, using national security to achieve a tiny democratic majority. The long connection between Republicanism and the expansion of individual freedom could be severely compromised. The attractiveness of a conservatism of doubt rests ultimately not on its ability to corral majorities. It rests on its central insight: that politics is not religion; that the U.S. guarantee of freedom is for all, not merely the majority; that political freedom must mean economic freedom, and that freedom is imperiled by fiscal recklessness; that there are worse things than doing nothing, especially if that "something" is the imposition of a divisive moral agenda.

There may come a reckoning for this political moment—and it may soon peak or deflate or be undone by its own hubris. Or it may not. What has to endure is not merely a reformed liberalism that can one day take government away from its current masters, but rather a conservatism that does not assent to its own corruption at the hands of zealots. This doesn't mean hostility to religion. It means keeping religion in its safest place—away from the trappings of power. And it means keeping politics in its safest place—as the proper arrangement of our common obligations, and not as a means to save or transform our lives and souls. If we are fighting such a conservatism of faith abroad—and that is the core of the war on Islamist terrorism—then why should it be so hard to confront it in much milder forms at home? This was, once upon a time, the central conservative calling. Why not again? ■

NEW REPUBLIC contributing editor Charles Krauthammer is seeking a research assistant. Send résumés to jobs@charleskrauthammer.com

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Varieties of Love

MICHELANGELO ANTONIoni, a master of masters, has contributed a short film to a trio of shorts called **EROS.** His film is "The Dangerous Thread of Things," which is also the title of one of three brief prose pieces in a book of his. (The book itself is *That Bowling Alley on the Tiber.*) The pieces were adapted for the screen by Tonino Guerra, his collaborator since *L'Avventura* (1960). For any Antonioni enthusiast, and I insist on a place in the front rank, all this advance information was exciting. Regretfully, I add that the film is not.

EROS
(Warner Independent)

WINTER SOLSTICE
(Paramount Classics)

First, some facts. In 1985 Antonioni had a stroke that paralyzed his right side and his power of speech. Nonetheless, in 1995 he made *Beyond the Clouds*, a four-part work, one part of which had substance and all of which was couched in his style. Reports and photos told us how he managed to command the shooting despite his handicaps—as well as the shooting of two subsequent short films. Now he presents this brief piece, made in 2004, when he was ninety-two. It has no substance and is only faintly reminiscent of his style.

A young husband and wife who live on the Tuscan coast are no longer close in feeling. When she sunbathes topless, he disregards her, somewhat deliberately. Later they drive off and stop at a waterfall where two naked girls are bathing. Then they go to a restaurant where the husband notices an attractive girl, who lives in an ancient tower near them, riding by on her horse. Next day he visits the tower, meets the girl, and they make love. Months pass. The husband is away in Paris. The wife walks on the beach one day, takes off her clothes, dances in the sea, and lies down. The girl comes along, strips, dances in the sea, and, nude, meets the nude wife.

This is a scenario out of which symbolic meaning might be inferred or on which it could be imposed. Throughout the film we long for the chance to do either. But Antonioni doesn't provide it. For a viewer who could not be more sympathetic, the picture is merely studied and affected, without resonance, noteworthy only for the fact that, like some other aging male directors, Antonioni fills the screen with female nudity.

The disparity between this piece and his epoch-making films, together with his present physical condition, provokes a suspicion. His passion for work—he has often said that, for him, to live is to film—is perhaps being cosseted by some who want another piece by Antonioni for his name's sake. What makes this new picture even more discomfiting is that there are two Antonioni features, *The Mystery of Oberwald* (1980) and *Identification of a Woman* (1982), that have never been released here. Neither is a major work in his career, but either of them is a feast compared with this latest scrap and would have been more welcome.

The other two short films in *Eros* are "The Hand" by Wong Kar-Wai and "Equilibrium" by Steven Soderbergh. Wong's picture, set in 1960 in Hong Kong, is about a tailor's apprentice and a famous courtesan, his awe of her and her utilization of it. The beautiful and gifted Gong Li, familiar from several Zhang Yimou films, is the languorous courtesan, and Chang Chen, familiar from *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, is the young man whom she leads into the world of sex. As always, Wong has the ability to incorporate environment in his story. The very walls of rooms, as his camera glides along them, seem erotic. Soderbergh's picture, which has the feel of an extended revue sketch, is about a psychiatrist (Alan Arkin) and a patient of his (Robert Downey Jr.), an advertising man sorely beset by a heavy new assignment and by a recurrent dream about a woman. Arkin again supplies his middle-aged philosophic urbanity, and Downey, more talented than he is usually rated, keeps himself fraught. Soderbergh moves it all well, except that it doesn't move to a satisfactory finish.

Both Wong and Soderbergh have understandably expressed their gratitude at, even in this tripartite way, being part of an Antonioni project. (A sort of theme song of the trilogy is actually called "Michelangelo Antonioni.") But *Eros* is better for what they contribute than for his work.

Some adjectives lie in wait for certain films. For **WINTER SOLSTICE,** two of those adjectives are "little" and "quiet." Josh Sternfeld has written and directed a picture about a widower and his two sons that begins and courses and finishes without ever blundering in its screenplay or its execution, and without stirring up anything like a strong emotional response.

This is Sternfeld's third feature, the first that I have seen. A widower in his late forties is a landscape gardener in New Jersey who has just about recovered from his wife's death in an accident five years earlier. He is now trying his best, his appealing best, to sustain a family feeling in the house, although his two boys, one around twenty and the other a few years younger, are reaching the point where the outside world looks more and more attractive. The father and sons go through the expected episodes of spat and reconciliation, of privacies tampered with, of fact-facing. Virtually everything that happens can be foreseen, including the arrival in the neighborhood of a personable single woman in her forties. The ending is not quite predictable; still, it grows so inevitably from the story that we almost feel we expected it.

What keeps the picture pleasant, first, is the cast. Anthony LaPaglia as the father, Aaron Stanford and Mark Webber as the two sons, Allison Janney as the woman: all are honest actors who shun cliché and are capable of nuance. The ac-

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tors' clear commitment to their characters helps greatly to hold us. Sternfeld not only deals empathically with his cast, he seems to know that his screenplay is not very novel or stirring; nonetheless, he wants to present these human beings in their skins, so to speak. It is as if he were telling us that just because what is happening in the house next door may be equally interesting, there's no reason not to look at the people in this house.

Insofar as something so grand as a theme can be laid on *Winter Solstice*, perhaps it might be that, no matter how busily or affectionately we plan, life and time are making their way along as they choose. And, as we plan and plan, they are chuckling. ■

LEE SIEGEL ON TELEVISION

The Rapture

MANY CATHODE-ILLUMINated years have passed since the term "infotainment" settled into reality and started appearing without quotation marks. The devolution of the evening news into a hybrid sort of entertainment is an old tale. In its original form, it simply meant that hard news stories would still be broadcast, but that there would be fewer of them, and more segments about lifestyle issues, celebrity shenanigans, and the like. How quaint it all was. Now you almost long for the bygone sense of alarm that you felt when the networks started to be All About You; when serious reports about eroding coastlines started giving way to more serious reports about expanding waistlines. Consider the past few weeks, in which American television discovered God.

First you had the television newspeople popping up in Atlanta and transforming themselves into evangelical Christians in order to perform—not report—the story of Ashley Smith, who claimed that God had used her as a divine instrument in his (disconcertingly messy) plan to bring a sinner into the light. Then they all piled into their shiny, decaled, satellite-topped vans and sped down to Florida, where this time they didn't so much perform as sensationally stage—and again, not exactly report—the conflict between the husband and the parents of poor Terri Schiavo, and the conflict between the will of God and the will of the state court. And then it was off to Rome.

In the new world capital of sacred feeling, the television newspeople deftly began to assimilate, like Method actors studiously researching a character's circumstances and environment. It was not long before all these media sophisticates began to speak about John Paul II's life and death in the manner of Calabrian peasant women. For CBS's Harry Smith, ensconced in this ancient place renowned for its beautiful and sunny days, "it's been a kind of miraculous week in its own way, because it's been beautiful and sunny." Before the pope's dying, death, funeral, and entombment, you can bet your cable subscription that most, if not all, of the talking heads converging on the Eternal City thought that a pectoral cross was something you did at the gym. But they were all Catholics now.

Miracles abounded. With astonishing verisimilitude, the newscasters spoke sentimentally, reverentially, about every single thing, no matter how trivial or dogmatic or cloying or cunning, that the late pope had said or done. Despite the fact that this church had its institutional origins in the Middle Ages, the funeral was, they insisted, unprecedented. For CBS's Allen Pizzey, the sheer number of people gathered in St. Peter's Square was itself a "miracle" that would easily serve as one of the two wonders the pope had to knock out of the park if he was to gain admission to sainthood. For CNN's Anderson Cooper, looking at the crowds lingering in the square after the funeral mass was finished, the experience of being there was so, like, spiritual: "This is the kind of energy, the kind of passion, the kind of love which we have witnessed." Most of the experts who were paraded before the cameras were Catholic priests. All of them turned out to have loved and admired the pope greatly. The complexities of history and philosophy, even the very rudiments of

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

William G. Bowen, Martin A. Kurzweil, & Eugene M. Tobin

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them, were nowhere to be found.

After nearly two weeks of obsessive round-the-clock coverage of the passing of John Paul II, it is clear that there is no longer a crisis in the ratio of hard news to soft news. Hard news has gone the way of "snow" at the end of a television channel's broadcast day. The delivery of the news is itself an event that now should be reported in some meta-news format. Maybe this accounts for the popularity of Jon Stewart's real-but-not-real send-ups of the news.

The talking heads are no longer content to sit back and report. Like the reality-show participants who can't bear to sit back and watch TV drama but have to be part of it; like the bloggers who broadcast their days and nights; like the memoirists; like the self-dramatizing performance artists; like that friend of yours who responds to every comment you make about world affairs with a story from his own life that illustrates each international event—like so many people nowadays who live inside their heads, the talking heads are trapped in the belief that they are experiencing what they are merely covering. They report the news as if they are making it.

Say what you will about the inaccuracy or the slantedness of mainstream print organs, a schism yawns between print and television news that gapes even wider than the split between the Roman and Eastern churches. Maybe because we take for granted the sharp differences between the two mediums, we no longer see that the differences are becoming more extreme. But the coverage of the pope depressingly demonstrated that television news has mutated from viewer-centered stories to reporter-centered stories. The anchor is dead. Long live the anchor!

WE GET UNCOMFORTABLE and occasionally outraged when we feel that some public figure has been "acting," or that a resonant public event has been "staged" in order to manipulate our feelings, in the manner of Bush's "Top Gun" landing on that aircraft carrier. We hear Reagan described as the Great Communicator and some of us roll our eyes, because we know that "communicate" is often a sunny synonym for "obfuscate." At the pope's funeral, however, you could tune in to CNN and hear international correspondent Jonathan Mann enthusiastically seconding an archbishop's shrewd counsel that "the next pope is going to have to be a communicator." The elementary journalistic response to such a prescription should have been either to let the statement stand by itself or to let viewers know that Mann knew—in his journalist's role as the vicar of common sense—what contrapuntal possibilities were lurking behind the term "communicator." But media submission came to the archbishop as Mann endorsed his sentiments.

Later we heard Alessio Vinci, CNN's Vatican correspondent, celebrate the fact that "this is a pope who uses symbols and symbolism in order to bridge those churches and those religions together." A slight inflection of integrity and professional skill, and you could hear a different kind of journalist carefully creating a space for the possibility that this was a pope who used symbols and symbolism as pretexts for virtuous inaction. Anderson Cooper, through whose hip body the funeral "sent chills," conceded that many people disagreed with the pope's teachings, "but they see him as a man who preached compassion, who preached tolerance and love." But was the fact that the pope preached these virtues enough to make his critics satisfied with his "teachings"? Cooper didn't create a space for that possibility. These days a television correspondent's main qualification is the ability to give the impression that he or she is feeling deeply.

This was an insult not just to non-Catholics, but also to Catholics who cherish their faith but also prize their critical stance toward the church (a stance that some traditions of Catholic thought have nourished). There was something chilling about CNN's sudden cessation of professional detachment. It covered the death of the pope as I imagine the media of Eastern Europe covered the death of Stalin. (No, I am not comparing the great enemy of communism to the great hero of communism.) For Mann, a supposedly secular representative of an allegedly secular news organization presumably dedicated to the presentation of unaffiliated facts, the totalizing worldwide broadcast of the pope's death and its aftermath meant that Catholic "themes are being taught to the world that doesn't know it," the main theme being that "Christ is available to all, and that man is mortal but has the promise of everlasting life." You yearned for a commercial break, which in this context would have had the liberating effect of an aria by Mozart. But Mann pressed on. In a state of near rapture, he suddenly related his own epiphany: "If you wanted ... a moment and experience that would spread what the Catholic Church has been teaching for two thousand years to people who don't normally hear it from the church, this is the ceremony, this is the event, this is the message." Hallelujah.

THERE HAS BEEN SOME CRITICISM of how news organizations exploited the occasion in Rome, but I have yet to see anyone remark that the trinity of recent events—Saint Ashley, Saint Terri, and the pope—exemplified a new reality in the delivery of the news in general. The television newspeoples' fluid inhabiting of the story, which is by definition always other people's story, was not merely pandering to a newly discovered religious market, or a nervous response to charges of "liberal" bias against religion. (Nobody had better make that accusation again.) Above all, it meant that stories About You, once intended to bring the news to more viewers, had been usurped. Now the television people were reporting real news in a way that made every event, no matter how "hard," a story that you experienced through the vicarious empathizing of the anchors and their cast of dozens. They were Us. And we were They.

Call it Newsaoke—karaoke with deadlines. The worst—or most gifted, depending on what qualities you are measuring—practitioners of Newsaoke are to be found on CNN. The networks had their share of oozing credulity, but nothing could surpass the Cable News Network, which for the duration of the ceremonies in Rome transformed itself into the Catholic News Network. This was perhaps inevitable, given the fact that a round-the-clock station devoted exclusively to news would inevitably try to adapt the news to all the genres it was competing against: drama, comedy, action-adventure, confessional talk show, and so forth. And maybe the network's mandate of eternal watchfulness had gone to its head, causing it to imagine that it was doing God's work in a godless world: according to CNN correspondent John Allen, "CNN and the papacy of John Paul II, in a sense, grew up together."

Some print journalists pointed out the irony (if not the offense) of the pope spending so much of his reign traveling the globe apologizing to everybody for

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centuries of church intolerance, stupidity, and slaughter. But the talking heads represented the apologies as crescendos of authentic feeling that actually accomplished the goals the church hoped to achieve by making them, and in some way absolved it. Christiane Amanpour earnestly related that the pope had apologized to the Muslims for the "excesses of the Crusades"—though not for the Crusades themselves—and also to the Jews for the Holocaust. She then solemnly intoned that during John Paul's pontificate the Catholic Church had apologized to the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Eastern Orthodox Church had apologized to the Catholic Church, for the schism that had occurred between them in the eleventh century, though neither set of apologies had closed the schism. This persistent discord between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christians was, she said, "the great sorrow of the pope's life," but neither she nor anybody else on television bothered to explain what the schism was really about, or what steps the pope might have taken to defy church doctrine and overcome it. There was little time for such nuances. There were still the matters of the Inquisition and the historical anti-Semitism that led to the Holocaust, and John Allen eagerly reminded us that this pope made sure to apologize for them, too. Also the *tsuris* with Galileo.

Meanwhile, an archbishop working as a consultant to CNN—there's a phenomenon—was able to show that the injuries were not all one-sided. Gerhard Schroeder himself had apologized to the Catholic Church, and also to the Polish people, for Germany's failure to come to the aid of Solidarity during the revolt against Soviet rule. All these apologies, the CNN theatrical troupe assured us, were "amazing" and "extraordinary" acts of reconciliation on the part of this pope, who also, we were told reverentially, had the courage actually to set foot in a synagogue, and also in a mosque. You almost felt like you should apologize to the church for making it feel so guilty that it had to do so much apologizing. Was the thing with Galileo really *that* bad?

There were moments of sanity, or at least an occasional recognition that the performance had gone too far. Toward the end of CNN's run in Rome, the network even brought in someone whose very presence might imply a criticism of this pope's attitudes toward women and human sexuality, one Claudia Spadazzi, an Italian gynecologist. Spadazzi assured viewers that far from being in thrall to the church, Rome was a great city "where there are many different realities." Of course, she couldn't have been directly critical of John Paul. And any such old-fashioned journalistic independence quickly collapsed under the weight of having to turn in the most treacly reading of events possible. When Jeff Greenfield tried to make the point that the massive demonstration of affection in St. Peter's Square did not necessarily signify broad support for the pope's more intransigent positions, Wolf Blitzer reined him in: "And yet at the same time, Jeff, the outpouring of emotion that we saw today involving the pope's funeral does involve an extraordinarily strong bond. You have to, I think, agree with that." You just have to.

By that point, only Christ himself could have harrowed the CNN crowd into some semblance of rational skepticism and detachment. For the pope had barely arrived in heaven when he seemed to swing into action. Amanpour credited him with the handshake between the Israeli president and the Syrian president: "Maybe it's the spirit of John Paul." "Amazing," agreed Cooper, who asked the archbishop-consultant if the pope was watching from heaven. "Certainly," said the archbishop, pleased to offer his expertise in the afterlife department. (What are his sources? I demand to know.) And the archbishop added that the pope watching from the sky "is pleased at the great number of young people who are here." But what about Schiavo, Sontag, Bellow, Hunter Thompson, Grace Kelly's husband, and all the other new arrivals? What about a special two-hour "edition" with the dead on *Larry King Live*? It would be, as they say in the kingdom of television, ratings heaven. ■

David A. Bell

The Bookless Future

What the Internet is doing to scholarship.

I.

Scenes from the Internet revolution in scholarship:

It is late at night, and I am at home, in my study, doing research for a book on the culture of war in Napoleonic Europe. In an old and dreary secondary source, I find an intriguing but fragmentary quotation from a newspaper that was briefly published in French-occupied Italy in the late 1790s. I want to read the entire article from which it came. As little as five years ago, doing this would have required a forty-mile trip from my home in Baltimore to the Library of Congress and some tedious wrestling with a microfiche machine. But now I step over to my computer, open up Internet Explorer, and click to the "digital library" of the French National Library. A few more clicks, and a facsimile copy of the newspaper issue in question is zooming out of my printer. Total time elapsed: two minutes.

It is the next day, and I am in a coffee shop on my university campus, writing a conference paper. A passage from Edmund Burke's *Letters on a Regicide Peace* comes to mind, but I can't remember the exact wording. Finding the passage, as little as five years ago, would have required going to the library, locating the book on the shelf (or not!), and paging through the text in search of the half-remembered material. Instead, on my laptop, I open Internet Explorer, connect to the wireless campus network, and type the words "Burke Letters Regicide Peace" into the Google search window. Seconds later, I have found the entire text online. I search for the words "armed doctrine" and up comes the quote. ("It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war. It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm, in every country.") Total time elapsed: less than one minute.

It is a few days later, and I am in my university office. I have seen a notice of a new book on Napoleonic propaganda, and am eager to read it. A few years ago, I would have walked over to the library and checked the book out. But this particular book does not exist on paper. It is

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an "e-book," published on the Internet only. A few clicks, and the text duly appears on my computer screen. I start reading, but while the book is well-written and informative, I find it remarkably hard to concentrate. I scroll back and forth, search for keywords, and interrupt myself even more often than usual to refill my coffee cup, check my e-mail, check the news, re-arrange files in my desk drawer. Eventually I get through the book, and am glad to have done so. But a week later I find it remarkably hard to remember what I have read.

AS THESE SCENES SUGGEST, IN the past few years the world of scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has been astonishingly transformed by the new information technology. Above all, it has been transformed by the amount of source material now available online—some of it by paid subscription, but much of it there for the taking by anyone with an Internet connection. Google made news in December with its ambitious plan to digitize the entire collections of several major research libraries (or at least the proportion that is in the public domain)—but to a much larger extent than the journalists who covered the story realized, the future that Google promises is already here. As I sit writing these words on my front porch, I can call up, in a matter of seconds, the sort of riches once found only in a handful of major research institutions: every issue ever printed of *The New York Times*; tens of thousands of classic and not-so-classic works of literature; a large majority of the books published in English before 1800; a million pages' worth of French Revolutionary pamphlets and newspapers; every issue of virtually every major American newspaper and magazine going back a decade or more; every page of most major American academic journals going back half a century; most major encyclopedias and dictionaries; all the major works of Western painters and sculptors. And much more is coming. Some of this material will remain available only in facsimile form. Much of it, though, is already entirely searchable. Name your keyword, and the Internet delivers the citations to you with the force of a fire hose in the face.

So far, most scholars have seen this transformation as a blessing—particularly those who do not have access to large, privileged research libraries. Indeed, its democratizing effects cannot be overestimated. Ten years ago, a historian whom I know took a job at the University of South Dakota. The entire library collection in her field ran little more than the length of her arm on the shelf, making real work on the subject effectively impossible, and she soon left. Today, a scholar in South Dakota, or Shanghai, or Albania—anywhere on earth with an Internet connection—has a research library at her fingertips, even without access to the "subscription-only" content that makes up a large share of the holdings. The only protest I have seen against this democratization of information has come from Jean-Noël Jeanneney, director of France's National Library. In a February op-ed piece in *Le Monde* that will long stand as a classic of unintentional Gallic self-parody, he complained that the Google project, by drawing principally on American libraries, would reinforce America's "crushing domination" of online information—no matter that the project will vastly expand the number of French books available as well, and that nothing is stopping France from engaging in a similar project of its own.

BUT THE INTERNET REVOLUTION is soon likely to become much more controversial, and for a simple reason: scholarship is fast moving toward a bookless future. Physical books are expensive to produce, and they are easily damaged or stolen. Shelf space costs money to build. Shelving and re-shelving books costs more. Stacks have to be kept at the appropriate temperature and humidity; they need to be lit, cleaned, inspected, and insured. Why, it is already being asked, should universities pay large sums to preserve and circulate physical books if copies exist online? Just as physical card catalogues have been stored away or even destroyed, replaced by electronic ones, so physical books are likely to follow. Libraries, in turn, are likely to turn increasingly into virtual information-retrieval centers, possibly located thousands of miles from the readers they serve. They already largely serve this function in the physical sciences, where the revolution in question took place much earlier, and without much protest.

Writers such as Nicholson Baker, who eloquently objected to the disappearance of the physical card catalogues, are likely to greet this much larger change with despairing howls of anger. They will defend the physical book as an irreplaceable treasure, dwelling in covetous detail on every aspect of it: the paper, the typefaces, the binding. They will talk about its tactile pleasures, about the inimitable scent of dusty vellum and leather, and compare these things to the unnatural, unpleasant, uncomfortable experience of reading on a screen. They will cite the famous line of Borges: "I have always imagined that Paradise will be a kind of library." They will call the transformation another victory of soulless barbarism over true culture.

But this stance, for all its obvious aesthetic attractions, is far too sentimental, and too easy. Not only is the advent of bookless or largely bookless libraries too large and powerful a change to be held back, it also offers too many real advantages for it to be considered a tragedy. Its democratizing potential, to begin with, counts for a great deal. Making vast libraries of learning available at no cost to anyone with an Internet connection is surely more important than preserving the rarefied pleasures of physical research libraries for those lucky or privileged enough to have easy access to them. The Internet also promises to make new forms of scholarship possible: new forms of research predicated on the rapid and efficient searching of vast databases, new hypertextual methods of presenting the results, and new means of ensuring their accuracy. Moreover, there are also ways—technological ways—of minimizing the aesthetic price to be paid.

What really matters, particularly at this early stage, is not to damn or to praise the eclipse of the paper book or the digital complication of its future, but to ensure that it happens in the right way, and to minimize the risks. For the risks are certainly real, and they go well beyond the disappearance of a particular physical object. The Internet revolution is changing not only what scholars read, but also how they read—and if my own experience is any guide, it can easily make them into worse readers. Technological innovation can help to address this problem, and it is already beginning to do so. But it is not yet receiving the support it needs, from either the publishing or the electronics industry.

II.

HOW IS THE INTERNET CHANGING the experience of reading? Consider the e-book that I found so hard to get through.

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Its title is *The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796–1799*, and in most ways it is a typical well-researched academic monograph. Fifteen years ago, its author, Wayne Hanley, would have easily found a university press willing to publish it as a sturdy hardcover volume with a print run of five hundred or a thousand copies.

But today specialized books of this sort are a distinctly endangered species. Their main purchasers—university libraries—have far less money to spend on these items than they once did. Computerized catalogues, subscription content, hugely expensive scientific journals, exploding storage costs: all these demands are putting tremendous pressure on budgets that are often already flat or declining. In response, libraries have cut back purchases or have started to form consortia with their neighbors, so that now only one research library in a given region may buy a particular book. As a result, specialized academic titles often sell as few as two hundred copies, and university presses lose an average of more than $10,000 on each. The presses have cut back in turn, particularly in the more arcane precincts of scholarship. They are also passing the cost pressures on to those authors they do accept; it is becoming routine in some fields for university presses to demand subsidies of $5,000 or more to publish a book, and to insist on strict limits on length. In some fields, the printed academic monograph seems dangerously close to extinction.

As scholars started to grapple with these problems several years ago, they concentrated, not surprisingly, on the immediate professional consequences: what happens to "publish or perish" if publishing becomes impossible? The obvious solution was to move specialized scholarship onto the Internet, but this presented its own set of professional problems. Today, anyone with a website is a "publisher." I have published several particularly specialized pieces of scholarship on my own website, for the sake of convenience. But this sort of "publishing" eliminates the peer reviewing that gives printed monographs the stamp of approval from the academic establishment, not to mention professional editing. Few scholars without tenure have the luxury to do it.

Just when these problems started to seem acute, Robert Darnton, a professor of history at Princeton, appeared on the scene with a suggestion. Darnton is a founding father of the field known as "the history of the book." (He was also my dissertation adviser.) Serving as president of the American Historical Association in 1999, he saw the chance not simply to write history, but to make it. He proposed creating a new book award, called the Gutenberg-e Prize, in fields of history where the publishing crisis had grown particularly acute. The winners, instead of the usual certificate and check, would instead get their manuscripts "published" online. Columbia University Press came on board as a sponsor, and to provide editing support. The result has been a "book series" well-produced and prestigious enough to convince the most demanding tenure committee.

And Darnton had even greater ambitions. As he pointed out in a series of articles, electronic monographs can be much more than simple "books on a screen." He envisioned scholarship as hypertext, with "books" that would operate on several layers: a top layer of argument, from which readers could click down to a lower level of more detailed substantiation, and, below that, to further levels of raw evidence. Darnton himself provided an example in an impressive experimental article titled "An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris," about the circulation of "seditious" information under the Old Regime. Published online (at *www.indiana.edu/~ahr/darnton*), it contains a thirty-five-page text, illustrations, maps, a score of transcribed police reports, and twelve music files of seditious songs. An early modern society in the midst of one communications revolution (most notably, the rise of the newspaper) had come under study by a scholar using the experimental methods of another.

Internet publication can also improve scholarship in another way: by allowing for easy correction of mistakes. Last year, with much fanfare, an impressive new version of the British *Dictionary of National Biography* appeared, only to have various critics assail it for all manner of minor and not-so-minor errors. Making corrections easily available to users of the print version is a Sisyphean task, but correcting the online version is ridiculously easy. And where serious disagreements arise, the publishers can, if they choose, publish the debates themselves online. The result would be to make the work less of an imposing, "definitive" monument, and more of an ongoing scholarly conversation—and that is an attractive proposition.

The "Gutenberg-e" series invented by Darnton now has eleven titles, ranging from Hanley's study of Napoleonic propaganda to Daniel Kowalsky's *Stalin and the Spanish Civil War* to Michael Katten's *Colonial Lists/Colonial Power: Identity Formation in Nineteenth-Century Telugu-Speaking India*. All are intelligent and lucid monographs, of interest principally to specialists. All take advantage of technology, even if they do not always live up to the promise of Darnton's hypertext model. Kowalsky's book includes short clips of Soviet newsreels alongside photographic illustrations, but in such low screen resolution as to make them virtually unwatchable. Gregory Brown's impressive monograph *A Field of Honor*, about French literary culture in the eighteenth century, has links to the collected works of several French authors, lengthy reproductions of archival documents, and hypertext links that allow one to move back and forth through the text in pursuit of particular themes.

For scholarly readers, these "books" are the shape of the future. Anyone who wants to check a citation in Edmund

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Burke can still find his works in print in any good library; but anyone interested in the Spanish Civil War who wants to learn Kowalsky's revisionist opinion of Soviet involvement, and anyone interested in the birth of modern literary culture who wants to consult Brown on the subject, has no choice but to read them online. And it is inevitable that great numbers of older, out-of-copyright titles will soon join these new ones in a cyberspace-only existence. One can almost hear the calculators clicking in the library offices: why keep multiple copies of *Hard Times*, *The Social Contract*, *Paradise Lost*, or *War and Peace* on expensive shelf space when anyone can download a perfectly good copy in his or her bedroom? Libraries that balked, decades ago, at putting much of their collections on microfilm, given the cumbersome machinery needed to read it, are showing no such hesitation when it comes to putting books on line.

But again: what will this rush to cyberspace mean for the simple act of reading? This is where the problems with the Internet revolution are most obvious, and most harmful, as I discovered with Hanley's book, and even more with Brown's *A Field of Honor*. Printed in standard form, even without the bibliography, this book would run 350 to 400 pages. It is clearly written, but it deals with difficult concepts, and it invokes dense and demanding theorists such as Bourdieu and Habermas. Even skipping certain sections, it took me many hours to get through, and by the end, the experience of reading on the screen had become, through no fault of the author's, distinctly painful.

III.

WHY IS READING ON THE screen so genuinely unpleasant? Start with a basic point: reading itself is a fundamentally unnatural act. Anyone who has ever taught a child to read will remember the difficulty involved in distinguishing, for instance, between lowercase b, d, and p. After all, if you move them around or flip them over, they are the same. We have to be taught to see them only as they appear, flat and unnatural, upon the printed page. And we have to be taught also to take in not just a few of these odd marks, but the thousands that go into telling even the simplest children's story, to say nothing of the roughly one million that make up *A Field of Honor*. It takes years of practice before most of us do it easily, and even then, when it comes to difficult texts, it is the rare reader who perseveres, hour after hour, without a break.

Faced with these problems, Western culture long ago invented the optimal device for reading. Devised in the fourth century to replace cumbersome scrolls and parchments, it was called the book: a series of pages bound together between sturdy covers, light, portable, and easy to hold in the hand. Although some books, considered deserving of particular reverence, came to be produced in large "folio" formats that could be consulted comfortably only on a desk or bookstand, most could be read virtually anywhere, in any position.

Remarkably, the great "printing revolution" that began with Johannes Gutenberg changed these practices very little. Gutenberg and his colleagues purposefully designed their new printed books as virtually exact physical copies of the manuscript books of the late Middle Ages. Put a printed book of the late fifteenth century side by side with a manuscript book of the same period, and it is surprisingly difficult to tell the gothic typeface of the one from the scribal handwriting of the other. The "revolution" was a revolution in the means of production far more than in the nature of the product itself.

IN THIS SENSE, OUR OWN COMmunications revolution has been strikingly different from the earlier one. It has emphatically not been "Gutenberg II." To state the obvious: computer screens were not originally intended to replace books, and it is something of a technological accident that they are now coming to do so. Until the advent of the personal computer twenty-five years ago, computer screens were mostly used by professional computer programmers. They were modeled on earlier devices such as teletype terminals, with their typewriter keys and endless scrolls of yellow paper, which in turn had partially replaced punch cards and paper and magnetic tape. While screens were used to read programs, and data, and the early e-mail messages carried by Arpanet, very few people used them to read prose texts of any length.

This situation began to change with the rise of the PC in the 1980s, and the Internet a decade later; but still computer screens did not evolve very far toward the physical form of the book. Screen resolution improved, and today even a basic laptop screen will hold several hundred words in a reasonable facsimile of a printed page. Yet most screens remain wider than they are long, unlike printed book pages. Most computers make it easier to scroll down, line by line, than to page through a text. And screens are by no means as portable or as comfortable to hold as books. Personal digital assistants (PDAs), while more comfortable, display very little text at a time.

There are good reasons why an evolution toward the form of the book has not taken place. The wide screen that looks so unnatural for book reading is perfect for spreadsheets and for video. Scrolling down, line by line, remains the logical way to view things like computer code. And computers are designed above all for the comfortable input of information, which is to say that the screen is locked to a keyboard (or, in the case of a PDA or a Tablet PC, the screen itself becomes a slate designed for writing on with a stylus). In short, reading has remained distinctly subordinate to the computer's other uses. Nothing could be more different from the printing revolution, which had the reproduction of an existing form—the book—as its principal purpose.

Unfortunately, this subordination has grim consequences for reading. Start with the fact that what is already an unnatural task becomes more physically uncomfortable. One must stare at a screen in an upright chair, or hold a heavy, awkward, and rigid piece of equipment on one's lap for hours. People will accept these constraints where no alternative is available—when working on a spreadsheet or playing computer games—but this is not the case with books. The relatively low resolution of even today's screens, compared with that of the printed page, tends to induce eyestrain. So does the fact that the eye remains at a constant distance from the screen. The tendency to scroll down rather than flip pages only makes things worse. It may seem a small detail, but a page becomes all the harder to concentrate on when the physical position of the words is constantly changing.

THE VERY NATURE OF THE COMputer presents a different problem. If physical discomfort discourages the reading of texts sequentially, from start to finish, computers make it spectacularly easy to

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move through texts in other ways—in particular, by searching for particular pieces of information. Reading in this strategic, targeted manner can feel empowering. Instead of surrendering to the organizing logic of the book you are reading, you can approach it with your own questions and glean precisely what you want from it. You are the master, not some dead author. And this is precisely where the greatest dangers lie, because when reading, you should not be the master. Information is not knowledge; searching is not reading; and surrendering to the organizing logic of a book is, after all, the way one learns.

If my own experience is any guide, "search-driven" reading can make for depressingly sloppy scholarship. Recently, I decided to examine the way in which the radical eighteenth-century thinker d'Holbach discussed warfare. I could have read his book *Universal Morality* in the rare-book room of my university library, but I decided instead to download a copy (it took about two minutes). And then, faced with a text hundreds of pages long, instead of reading from start to finish, I searched for the words "war" and "peace." I found a great many juicy quotations, which I conveniently cut and pasted directly into my notes. But at the end, I had very little idea of why d'Holbach had written his book in the first place. If I had had to read the physical book, I could still have skimmed, cut, and pasted, but I would have been forced to confront the text as a whole at some basic level. The computer encouraged me to read in exactly the wrong way, leaving me with little but a series of disembodied passages.

Of course, there was an obvious alternative to reading on the screen: printing the thing out. With d'Holbach, I did print the first hundred or so pages, only to have my computer chirpily announce that it was time for another expensive ink cartridge. Printing out is an expensive proposition, as well as a troublesome and time-consuming one. In any case, printing a book out goes against the point of using the Internet in the first place. Printing takes away the hypertext, multimedia functions built into works such as Darnton's. And reading on the screen, frustrating as it is, has certain advantages. On my own computer I keep several foreign-language dictionaries and a good thesaurus; the Oxford English Dictionary and the Encyclopaedia Britannica are just a few clicks away. I can have several books open at the same time to compare texts. I have immediate access not just to Internet resources but, on my hard drive, to just about every note I have taken and every piece of writing I have done in the last twenty years. Finally, there is a certain intellectual justification for instant gratification: ideas occur with particular readiness when you can pursue a train of thought quickly from one book to another. Readers of physical books have long known this form of research—it is called browsing in the stacks.

Nighttime Begins with a Line by Pablo Neruda

So my body went on growing, by night,
went on pleading & singing to the earth
I was born to be woven back into: Love,
let me see if I can't sink my roots
deeper into you, your minerals & water,
your leaf-rot & gold, your telling & untelling of the oldest tales inscribed
on wind-carved rocks, silt & grass,
your song & prayers, your oaths & myths,
your nights & days in one unending lament,
your luminous swarm of wet kisses
& stings, your spleen & mind,
your outrageous forgetting & remembrance,
your ghosts & rebirths, your thunder stones
& mushrooms, & your kind loss of memory.

YUSEF KOMUNYAKAA

IV.

IS THERE A WAY TO HAVE THESE advantages without doing lasting harm to the experience of reading itself? Perhaps, at least in part. What is needed is a technological solution, in the spirit of the original Gutenberg revolution, the revolution of the fifteenth century. That is to say, what is needed is a computer that looks and feels exactly like a book. And it is coming. Recent advances in "electronic ink" and new reading devices so far sold only in Japan come tantalizingly close to this ideal, but there are still major obstacles on the road—not all of them technological.

To date, the various attempts to produce specialized electronic reading devices have mostly been failures. In 1999, at the height of the tech boom, gadgets called the SoftBook and the Rocket eBook created a brief stir when they came on the market. Designed explicitly for reading, they were light, easy to hold, and had vertical, page-like screens, although with poor resolution by today's standards. But both devices flopped. So did a cheaper, smaller, PDA-like version called the eBookman, sold by Franklin.

The electronics industry has had marginally greater success getting people to use their PDAs, laptops, cell phones, and Tablet PCs for reading. A number of programs such as Palm Reader, Microsoft Reader, and Acrobat eBook make these computers as "book-like" as possible, including special screen fonts that in theory reduce eyestrain. But e-books have not yet come close to challenging the hegemony of printed books. Their sales, while growing, amount to a tiny percentage of industry totals (just under $10 million in the first three quarters of 2004). Barnes and Noble, which made a significant effort to sell e-books on its website, quietly discontinued the practice last year.

Perhaps the surest sign of the insignificance of e-books is that for years electronic versions of best-sellers have been available on file-sharing services such as Kazaa without causing much scandal or even notice. *The New York Times* estimated recently that as many as 25,000 titles can be downloaded, including all the Harry Potter novels and *The Da Vinci Code*—but sales of the print versions have not been hurt enough to make the publishing industry worry. Most book editors I know are not even aware of the files' existence.

THE PHYSICAL E-BOOK READERS have failed for three reasons. First, and most important, the various devices are simply not book-like enough. While the specialized reading machines, PDAs, and cell phones are lighter and more comfortable to hold than computers, their screens are terribly small and coarse. A Pocket PC screen using Microsoft Reader can display barely a hundred words at a time, which makes even a relatively short book more than a thousand screens long. The Tablet PC does better on this score, but it is heavy, rigid, and awkward, and thus has been marketed almost

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exclusively as a note-taking device. Nor does any of these gadgets really solve the eyestrain problem—even with Reader, which Microsoft released to considerable fanfare a few years ago and has since allowed to wither. Secondly, the specialized reading devices, while slightly more comfortable, were too expensive. Who was going to spend $800 on RCA's color version of the Rocket eBook when a few hundred dollars more would purchase a full-featured laptop with a better screen?

Most importantly, the companies, clearly fearing that the devices themselves would not generate sufficient income, focused instead on selling "proprietary content"—that is, encoded versions of books under copyright. Several of them, such as the SoftBook, initially did not even provide a way for readers to load their own readings onto the devices. As might have been predicted, the companies thereby drove themselves into a classic vicious circle: publishers refused to make more than a handful of titles available without evidence of readers' interest, and readers, faced with a tiny selection of titles, shunned the devices entirely.

This story points to one of the most powerful factors inhibiting the development of book-like computers and reading devices: the publishing industry itself. For the moment the sharing of pirated book files over the Internet has attracted little attention. But imagine the development of a computer that really was as easy and as comfortable to read as a book. Would book-sharing become as great a threat to publishing as music-sharing has been to the record labels? True, there is no real textual equivalent to the "ripping" of a music CD. Most readers have little incentive to turn libraries of books they have already read into shareable files, and doing so is far more difficult than ripping a CD. It involves either breaking open a coded file or tediously scanning a book, page by page.

Still, only one person has to take the trouble, and within hours millions of copies can be circulating on the Internet. Remember that text files are very, very small compared with music or video. A best-seller can be downloaded over a high-speed connection in a matter of seconds. This scenario must cause publishers some sleepless nights.

And the moment may be coming closer. In Japan, Sony and Panasonic recently released new-generation reading devices that put clunky predecessors like the SoftBook to shame. Sony's entry, called the LIBRIé, is particularly impressive, for it employs a technology called "electronic ink," in which the screen is composed of tiny "microcapsules" that can turn black or white through the manipulation of an electronic field. While previous screen technologies required an internal source of illumination, electronic ink does not, making it easily readable even in full sunlight and cutting back significantly on bulk and power consumption. It also has greater resolution than previously achieved. The LIBRIé weighs only a little more than a pound, can run for weeks on ordinary AAA batteries, and displays half a million pixels on its six-inch screen—six times more than most PDAs. To put things simply, it weighs the same as a book and looks very much like paper (although it takes a frustratingly long time to "turn" pages). For the moment, it is available only in black and white, but full-color versions are said to be only a few years down the road. And even the first-generation model costs less than $400.

But will the LIBRIé succeed? At first, Sony and Panasonic both repeated the disastrous strategy of allowing only proprietary content, downloaded from special websites for a fee, onto the devices, and Japanese publishers refused to make more than a relative handful of titles available. Will people pay hundreds of dollars for a reading device when they cannot use it to read work documents or free books downloaded from websites of their own choice? Will publishers make enough books available to persuade readers to purchase such a limited device? I have my doubts. More recently, both companies have made it possible to use the devices to read other documents, but only after a complicated conversion process that will repel most users. Sony has yet to announce a release date for the LIBRIé in the United States. I suspect that such devices will only truly succeed when they have the full capacities of computers—so that readers can download Web pages and electronic books onto them as easily as I now download my research materials onto my laptop.

V.

When this happens, it is entirely possible that a second Gutenberg revolution will finally take place, bringing about the long-discussed paperless office, together with the bookless library. If I had an inexpensive, full-function computer that was roughly the size and the weight of a hardcover novel, with a high-resolution, paper-like color screen, a detachable keyboard, and wireless Internet access, I would be quite happy to stop squeezing new bookshelves into my basement and office.

But this scenario is not inevitable. The publishing industry can do a great deal to frustrate it by refusing to make copyrighted material easily available in electronic form for fear of piracy. Traditional book-lovers can also do a certain amount to frustrate it, by stigmatizing electronic publishing as the sign of a second dark ages. And if demand for advanced reading devices remains low as a result, then the electronics industry will not invest significant resources in electronic ink, and the LIBRIé will go the way of the SoftBook.

The traditionalists may applaud this outcome, but they would be wrong to do so. Frustrating the development of real "book-like" reading devices will undoubtedly slow the transformation of libraries into virtual information centers. It will slow the pace at which books are scanned and then relegated to sub-basement storage facilities. It will stave off the death of the academic monograph. But it will not stop any of these things, not least because the financial pressures bringing them about are too strong. It will just make the electronic books we have—and we will have more and more of them—unnecessarily awkward and difficult to read. It will encourage searching rather than true reading, and turn eyestrain into a new form of occupational hazard for scholars everywhere.

It would be far better for publishers to learn from the semi-disastrous experience of the music industry. Threatened by Napster and its clones, the record labels initially tried to shut down the new technology by heavy-handed legal tactics, but eventually made songs available online themselves for a reasonable price

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and with reasonable restrictions. And when they did, consumers flocked to services such as Apple's iTunes. The publishing industry would do well actively to plan for the day when it will sell a majority of its products not on paper but over the Internet, to consumers who will read them on new, attractive, paper-like screens.

BUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE experience of reading, particularly in scholarship? Will traditional reading—the slow, serious reading of entire texts—sink from sight in an ocean of hypertext searching? We can at least hope not. Reading itself will surely change, for the simple reason that new electronic devices, even if they look and feel exactly like books, will still be different from them—far more different than Gutenberg's books were from their printed predecessors. For one thing, they will most likely be full-function computers, with word-processing and Internet capability. But we can hope that as the physical discomforts and frustrations of reading on a screen diminish, more traditional sorts of reading will find their way into cyberspace—that readers, holding a truly "readable" computer in their hands, will not abandon themselves to searching and clicking, but will instead find it comfortable to sit, and read slowly, and stop to ponder what they have read.

And even the newer forms of reading are not to be entirely deplored. For a start, they will encourage new works of scholarship to take full advantage of the possibilities of hypertext and multimedia in a way that the pioneering Gutenberg-e books, for the most part, have not. Even more important, they will raise the simultaneously glorious and terrifying possibility of having an entire world library at one's fingertips. In any case, we need not assume that one form of reading will entirely replace others. Different forms have always co-existed with one another. Before Gutenberg, when books were rare and expensive, the dominant form was probably the slow, intensive, repetitive study of sacred and quasi-sacred texts. It may have remained so even during the first centuries of printing, but gradually it was challenged by more "extensive" sorts of reading, involving the relatively quick, onetime perusal of books for entertainment and the speedy acquisition of information. But the first sort never disappeared, and of course it still exists in many settings. Now, with the Internet, have come yet newer styles. But they, too, can co-exist with older varieties, especially within the academy.

Perhaps this is too sanguine a view. But scholars are, after all, professional readers. The books that they read are likely, as time goes on, to have a physical existence only as evanescent electrical patterns on delicate pieces of machinery, and this technology will affect the way they read. As long as the things they read are as physically easy to read as paper books, scholars need not be overwhelmed by their new world of choices, any more than the scholars of the Renaissance were overwhelmed when faced with the sudden explosion of books brought by the printing press itself (although they certainly had to invent new strategies to deal with it). Those scholars adapted and flourished; and so can we. The bookless future need not be a barbarian age. The character of our culture will finally be determined in the old way, not by the form of words and ideas, but by their content. ■

Daniel J. Kevles

The Gene Wars

THE MAN WHO INVENTED THE CHROMOSOME: A LIFE OF CYRIL DARLINGTON
By Oren Solomon Harman
(Harvard University Press, 329 pp., $49.95)

IN THE HALF-CENTURY AFTER THE identification of the structure of DNA in 1953, a generation of biologists forged the revolution of molecular genetics. They deciphered the genetic code, invented biotechnology, and found themselves entangled in the high-stakes and sometimes tempestuous politics of genetics and society. A few won Nobel Prizes, a number gained fame and wealth, and all achieved iconic status for their involvement with DNA, the revolution's emblematic molecule. But if they achieved much, it was because, like Newton, they stood on the shoulders of giants, the leading biologists who in the decades after the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 1900 established the field of classical (as distinct from molecular) genetics. These researchers worked out the mechanisms of Mendelian heredity, reconciled them with Darwin's theory of evolution, and applied them successfully to agriculture and not so successfully to human beings. And they, too, became embroiled in politics, campaigning for eugenics, where biology confronted human rights, and battling over Lysenkoism, where the stakes were the freedom of science in the new Soviet state.

This first generation was multinational, but its British leaders, along with their counterparts in the United States, contributed with signature force to its scientific achievements and its political controversies. Cyril Darlington, born in 1903, grew up with Mendelism. He was a peer in what Oren Solomon Harman rightly calls the "great founding school" of British genetics, which also included William Bateson, J. B. S. Haldane, Julian Huxley, and Ronald Fisher. Darlington's obituaries referred to him as the "Copernicus" or the "Newton" of his branch of the field, which mainly comprised genetics at the cellular level, particularly the behavior of chromosomes and their relationship to evolution. Politically engaged like his peers, he was among the first biologists to denounce Lysenko and to indict the Soviet Union for persecuting Lysenko's enemies. Yet for all his prominence, Darlington has been forgotten. It is not simply that he has been obscured by the dazzle of DNA. It is also that later in life he embraced a degree of hereditary determinism and a contempt for the welfare state that made him appear to be, as Harman puts it, "a dinosaur, a crank."

Harman's brilliant book—the first and, almost surely, the definitive biography—wrests the earlier Darlington from the later crank, recovering him as a human being and restoring him to scientific eminence. Drawing on Darlington's

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voluminous papers, correspondence, and diaries, Harman recounts the personal odyssey that took his subject from a bleak childhood to high achievement in the new genetics; his scientific and political engagements, particularly his differences over Lysenko with his fellow biologists, many of them on the left; and his slide into the cantankerous biological conservatism that marked his later years. Harman writes in supple prose and with capacious discernment, providing a portrait of the man that is at once empathetic and critical, a study in character and personality that illuminates his science as well as his personal and professional lives.

DARLINGTON WAS AN UNwanted second son (his father marked Cyril's birth by moving permanently out of his mother's bed). The senior Darlington, a former schoolmaster who worked for a chemical company near London, was harsh; the mother was straitlaced. Cyril left for St. Paul's School in London, and then attended an agricultural college, where he discovered Mendelism. In 1923, he went as a junior researcher to the John Innes Horticultural Institution, at Merton in Surrey, which William Bateson, its head and an early champion of Mendelism, was turning into a major center in "genetics," a word that he coined. Darlington got hooked on chromosomes when he first saw them through the microscope of a staff cytologist.

Chromosomes, so named because they take on color when stained, reside in the nucleus of the living cell and, as was well established by the 1920s, are the bearers of heredity. (In current terms, they comprise DNA embedded in protein.) In the quiescent cell, they form an undifferentiated mass, but in the dividing cell they disentangle themselves and perform a variety of maneuvers, one set of which is characteristic of the regularly dividing cell (mitosis) and another, of the sexually dividing cell (meiosis). In meiosis, for example, similar chromosomes find and pair with each other, lining up or forming a physical cross (a "chiasma"); they also exchange genetic information, a process dubbed "crossing over" or "recombination." How they managed their maneuvers was pretty much disputed and mysterious when Darlington arrived at the John Innes.

Darlington soon set out to clear up the mystery, investigating pairing first in hyacinths, then in tulips. Harman suggests that he found serenity and solace in peering through the microscope—an escape from his father's insults and his mother's moodiness. The work progressed well, and he grew increasingly self-assured. "At the age of 18 most of the world seemed stupid and annoyed me; at 24 I know it is stupid and it ceases to worry me," he wrote. In 1931, generalizing from his observations at the microscope, he concluded that crossing over was linked mechanically via chiasmata to pairing and, indeed, to the entire integrated process of sexual reproduction.

Further study of chiasmata formation convinced him that genetic crossing over must occur in all organisms and that it figured in evolution. To no small degree, the field of genetics had grown out of experimental programs designed to resolve certain conundrums raised by Darwin's theory, particularly the question of what natural selection acts upon. The first generation of geneticists, remaining absorbed by the puzzles, recognized that genetic mutation supplied material for natural selection. Darlington, who was also attentive to evolutionary issues, contended that natural selection could act as well on the new genetic combinations produced by crossing over. He also held that chromosomes and their behavior were themselves products of the evolutionary process. As Harman, who lucidly conveys Darlington's science, puts it: "Not only did heredity *lead* to evolution ... heredity itself was *subject* to evolution."

DARLINGTON SUMMARIZED HIS chromosomal work and ideas in *Recent Advances in Cytology*, published in 1932 to high praise from Haldane, an exacting critic. But while the book was, as Harman observes, a "masterpiece," the responses from many cytogeneticists ranged from cool to hostile. Harman insightfully parses the reaction. Cytology, like most of biology, was a strongly empirical science, closely tied to what the microscope revealed; but Darlington's claims were often deductive. Then, too, the great American geneticist Thomas Hunt Morgan, who won a Nobel Prize in 1933 for his group's pioneering elucidation of the mechanism of Mendelian heredity, tended to take the chromosome for granted, in contrast to Darlington's insistence that it operated under genetic, and thus evolutionary, control.

Most disturbing was Darlington's propensity to theorize, his willingness to lace his book with cascades of conjectures. Harman points out that Darlington admired the great German biologist August Weissmann, who in the late nineteenth century forged disparate observations concerning the stuff of heredity into the construct of germ plasm, and who declared that "the time in which men believed that science could be advanced by the mere collection of facts has long passed away." In his research on chromosomes, Darlington, too, had faced "a mass of unruly observations," Harman notes (much the same, one might add, as contemporary biologists confront a mushrooming catalogue of genes). Harman observes that Darlington, like Weissmann, considered theorizing, if not an expression of truth itself, a way of laying out a road map to reach it.

Struggling against the current sandstorm of genetic data, biologists today have grown more sympathetic to theorizing, spinning computerized hypotheses from genetic data banks. Biologists in Darlington's day resisted theorizing. Conjectures were all right if associated with abundant facts, one reviewer of *Recent Advances in Cytology* carped, adding: "But the ratio of facts to conjectures should be kept in the ratio of food to wine. We know what happens when the wine is in excess." Some geneticists thought that Darlington had imbibed too much. He "was better at thinking up an idea than actually proving its truth experimentally," Harman writes. Resistance was also directed against the strong connection that Darlington found between cytology and evolution. Many geneticists disliked his claims for the role in evolution of recombination partly because they were conjectural and often untestable.

Still, cytology before Darlington had been merely an assistant to genetics. Harman argues that by unifying cytology into a theoretical whole, he helped to foster its recognition as a full partner. On the evolutionary front, particularly the modern synthesis of evolution and genetics that emerged by 1940 and to which Haldane, Fisher, Huxley, and the American Sewall Wright mightily contributed, the future was with Darlington. The late Ernst Mayr, a grand master of the field, noted that "no one made a greater contribution to the understanding of recombination and its evolutionary importance than Darlington."

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Darlington alienated many biologists, dismissing cytological data-gatherers with ridicule. He was a contentious man. Harman finds in him a strong tendency to mock middle-class conventions, especially those embodied in his parents. Strapping and handsome, he was a promiscuously successful lover at the John Innes. In 1932–1933, when he was thirty and on a fellowship year in the United States, he married a free-thinking history teacher at Vassar, who had suggested matrimony after a few days of courtship so that she could bear his child. When his mother wrote to disapprove, he responded that he and his bride had bathed in the nude on a Cape Cod beach. The couple soon parted, obtaining a divorce two years later in Reno.

Yet there was a harsh streak in Darlington's character, something more than anti-bourgeois rebelliousness. In 1937, in Scotland, he married an English botanist, who in England, where his Reno divorce was unrecognized, was his common-law wife. As such, she had none of a wife's rights under English law, a lack of status that he invoked when, in 1949, he left her and the five children they had produced to marry one of the couple's friends, refusing at first to pay not only alimony but also child support. The pairings he lived were not as admirable as the pairings he studied.

ALL THE WHILE DARLINGTON flourished at the John Innes Institution, a vital center in genetics, evolution, and cytology with a cocky staff who were, as Harman notes, "young, smart, and leading the way." Among them, on a regular part-time basis from 1928 on, was Haldane, a rugged aristocrat, brilliant mathematical geneticist, intellectual iconoclast, and social rebel who was moving steadily leftward and in 1942 joined the Communist Party. At the time, Darlington also had strong leftist tendencies, faulting eugenics because of its "arbitrary" distinction between desirable and undesirable classes and indifference to the way environmental variations affected human achievement. Darlington and Haldane spent a great deal of time together discussing science, politics, and the philosophies of Marx and Engels. Eleven years Haldane's junior, Darlington found Haldane's qualities appealing, and remembered that for a long while "I regarded him as my infallible mentor." In the 1930s, he considered Engels's dialectical materialism a useful heuristic tool for science and endorsed rational state planning to exploit science for good social purposes.

Then came the battle over Lysenko, Stalin's protégé, who contended in neo-Lamarckian fashion that organisms such as winter wheat could be genetically modified by changes in their environment in ways that would transform Soviet agriculture. Lysenko denounced so-called Mendelism/Morganism as erroneous and a tool of bourgeois science. Some of its advocates were imprisoned, exiled, or shot. Many geneticists in the United States and Britain recognized Lysenkoism as a travesty, but while they were willing to expose its unfounded science, Harman emphasizes, they preferred to treat it publicly in the Soviet context as "an isolated scientific aberration." They shied from attacking the political structure of Lysenkoism because they did not want to discredit the Soviet state and its role in science. Such a political calculus was privately expressed by the American geneticist Herman Muller, a socialist who had gone to work in the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s and felt increasingly endangered by his staunch defense of Mendelism/Morganism. Fleeing on a train to Spain in March 1937, he wrote to Darlington that he would not "tell the truth to the world about the situation there. It would be too damaging to the opinion of scientists about the U.S.S.R.... I do not want to become an agent of anti-Soviet propaganda."

Darlington had no such reservations. An unalloyed disbeliever in the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired traits, he was offended by "the fakes or fancies of Lysenko" and outraged by Stalin's political persecutions, especially of his friend Nikolai Vavilov, a prominent Russian geneticist who died in a Soviet prison during the war. In an article written in 1946, he scathingly criticized Lysenko's doctrines and the Soviet oppressions conducted in their name, declaring that in the Soviet Union "we see indeed the official overthrow of truth and reason ... no less official than that in Hitler's Germany.' The editor of *Nature*, calling the piece "undesirable," declined to publish it, and so did the editor of the *Fortnightly Review*, explaining that he was "fearful of being thought a stumbling block to better relations between the countries." After the piece appeared in a minor scientific magazine, it caught the admiring attention of George Orwell, who arranged for its appearance in a magazine of broad circulation. It prompted dissents, some of them wrathful, from several prominent biologists and the communist left.

The apologists continued in force even after the Communist Party Congress in Moscow in August 1948 adopted Lysenko's biology as the party's official biology. To be sure, Haldane, who had wanted to believe that the reports of the disappearance of Soviet scientists were the products of vicious rumors spread by enemies of the Soviet Union, now left the party. And Muller resigned from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, blasting the Soviet Union for its attempt to establish "a politically directed 'science,' separated from that of the world in general, in contravention of the fact that true science can know no boundaries." Still, Harman notes, Haldane was the only prominent Marxist scientist in Britain to quit the party.

HARMAN WONDERS WHY DARLINGTON's reaction to Lysenkoism diverged so sharply from that of his colleagues, even the non-Marxist ones. One reason was his growing disillusion with Haldane: his irritable persona, his formalist genetics, and his evasive politics, particularly his persistent refusal, until 1948, to face up to Lysenkoism. Harman likens Darlington and Haldane to two ideological travelers who approached each other, resonated for some years, and then proceeded on their respective journeys. Darlington's enthusiasm for Soviet Marxism began waning just as Haldane's enthusiasm was waxing. Their ideological differences were compounded by their rivalry, beginning in 1936, for the directorship of the John Innes, to which Darlington was appointed in 1939. Darlington had become his own man, and he no longer wanted Haldane's mentorship.

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Harman finds that Darlington's reasons for attacking Lysenkoism reached deeply into his own evolving views on the role of science in shaping the human future. His political journey past Haldane was taking him to the right. If in the 1930s he had embraced state mobilization of science for socio-economic development, in the 1940s, having come to hate totalitarianism, he increasingly rejected such direct state intervention, especially the Soviet version. At bottom, Harman writes, his belief in "the biological diversity of man" was growing, and so was his "disbelief in the possibility of changing [man's] nature by anything other than biological means." The belief and the disbelief were coming into direct conflict with both the Marxist goal of egalitarianism and its credo that human beings might be improved by modifying their socio-economic environment.

By the late 1940s, Darlington had become, in Harman's description, "a *racialist* scientific humanist, convinced that genes determine behavior, skill, and intelligence, *and* that if scientifically guided social planning were to ignore the inherent biological differences in capacity and function between people and races, it was bound to fail." He first advanced his racial genetic determinism in the early 1940s, even while Hitler was visiting his excrescences on Western civilization, and drew on complicated arguments concerning race, class, and mating in human evolution that Harman skillfully elucidates. He held that human capacities and behavior, including intellectual and cultural character, are grounded in genetics. Human evolution thus proceeded optimally under the parallel conditions of inbreeding (segregation of groups by race and class) and outbreeding (intermixing across groups that would produce a kind of intellectual and cultural hybrid vigor). For Darlington, the division of human beings into races and classes was evolutionarily advantageous, provided the division was unstable, and those who sought to proscribe discussion of genetic differences among races and classes offered the "council of timidity and escape."

DARLINGTON EXPECTED THAT this line of argument, which undergirded much of the rest of his life's work, would get him into trouble. But he relished the role of the *enfant terrible*, the disturber of the ideological peace, duty-bound to make people realize that a system committed to human equality would be doomed to fail and evolutionarily counterproductive. He found a target in the Statement on Race that UNESCO issued in 1950. Drafted and revised by a number of leading geneticists and social scientists, the document dismissed the concept of race as scientifically meaningless and claims for the connection of genes and culture as lacking scientific support. Harman takes the statement as an expression of the day's politically correct science, suggesting that it rested on "dubious scientific ground" and that its signers were willing to bend "Mendelism and Darwinism in the service of antiracism." He misrepresents some of the document's essentials, writing that it "rejected the notion that races differed in mental capacity." It asserted, in fact, that IQ tests "do not in themselves enable us to differentiate safely between what is due to innate capacity and what is the result of environmental influences," and it pointed out that what people often identified as racial differences were differences in ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Still, Harman rightly observes that little direct scientific evidence existed for several of its claims. And the statement did signal the emergence of what he calls "a powerful consensus against discussion of genetic determinants of racial differences," which raised a red flag to Darlington.

Darlington responded to the statement in a book that he called *The Facts of Life*, contending that different races would always differ, that where race crossing was disadvantageous it should be prohibited, and that the homogenization of the races should be avoided lest it foreclose consideration of how the diverse capacities of each race might be used for the benefit of all races. He also contended that behavioral traits such as criminality, reason, imagination, and success in school and even in marriage were not the products of acculturation and habit but of genetics. Reviewers of the book denounced it as scientifically unfounded, biased, and in some respects ridiculous—for example, his attribution of the evolution of social class in Britain over fifteen hundred years to a polymorphism (a variant in several genes across the population). Muller, who had also been disturbed by the "exaggerated" UNESCO statement, nevertheless told his friend Darlington that, in his view, "differences of historical background have played much the largest role in the observed behavior differences between peoples."

IN 1953, DARLINGTON ACCEPTED a professorship at Oxford University, which he hoped would provide an advantageous platform for the promotion of his theories of human evolution. He tried to remake biology at the university by integrating through genetics disparate fields such as botany, forestry, zoology, biochemistry, agriculture, and clinical medicine. He was ahead of his time in such an ambition, but he was also handicapped in realizing it by his cutting sarcasm and his resistance to the new molecular biology of DNA. In 1964, he told an interviewer that the strongest motivator in his personality, apart from curiosity, was "indignation."

Undaunted by the negative reaction to *The Facts of Life*, Darlington continued to work on its contentious subjects, bringing the fruits of his labors together in *The Evolution of Man and Society*, a magnum opus of some seven hundred pages that was translated into many languages. Published in 1969 amid the turmoil over race in both the United States and Britain, including the National Front's anti-immigrant movement, it advanced a sweeping genetic determinism that identified the book and its author with the racist right. So, similarly, did his associations with various professional groups and journals, and so did his last book, *The Little Universe of Man*, which appeared in 1978, three years before his death, and railed against the welfare state, trade unions, communitarianism, and what he termed the "taboo on the study of hereditary differences."

The behavioral biologist Konrad Lorenz, an intellectual collaborator of the Nazis, praised the book, and so did Ernst Mayr, evidently a closet inegalitarian, who wrote to Darlington, "I am delighted you have said all these things which are so true but which are simply suppressed in the 'egalitarian' mass media. . . . I am frank to say, your bias, or I should say government policies based on your bias, should promise a far better future for mankind than the ruling bias." Revealingly, as Harman points out, these kudos were delivered privately. The public response of the critics ranged from intellectual condemnation to personal vituperation. Among most mainstream scientists the book sealed Darlington's reputation as a racist crank.

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Indeed, as Harman observes, he was by then "a man out of time," or worse, "little more than an ideologue masquerading as a scientist." Many people in and out of science agreed with Karl Popper, who remonstrated to Darlington that even if men are born unequal in talents and character, "we ought to treat them as far as the law and public institutions are concerned as equal." Political philosophy aside, advances in evolutionary theory and human genetics had increasingly discredited Darlington's scientific reading of race.

HARMAN POINTS OUT THAT Darlington's methods—his reliance on theory at the expense of data—were both his strength and his undoing. It led him sometimes in his contrariness and enthusiasm to "ideas unsupported by well-established fact." "All my life I have been trying to tie things together," Darlington once wrote, "using or finding ideas that will help to make small bits into larger bundles.... It makes friends critical, critics angry and enemies furious." That acknowledged, Harman wonders whether the fact that his contemporaries never granted him the respect they gave to Haldane, for example, and that he has been forgotten, may say as much about the intellectual tolerance of his audience as it says about Darlington.

Harman sympathizes with the view of Darlington's friends that he was not a racist, noting that he rejected notions of a hierarchy among human groups as nonsense and endorsed not only the segregation of the races but also their mixing as the promise of evolutionary survival. His genetic determinism might have made him a eugenicist, but he was too persnickety and too averse to evangelical causes to join any movement, particularly one for human biological improvement to a uniform standard. Rather, his theory of evolution led him to value human diversity and to urge protection of the natural environments that sustain it.

As a stern critic of Soviet persecution, Darlington had been ahead of his time, at least among the British scientific left. As an environmentalist, he was with his time. And Harman counts him as having been ahead of his time in insisting that genes are related to behavior. While race is no longer "a viable biological category," Harman remarks, "the claim that genes have nothing to do with behavior has to be abandoned." Human society is shaped by both genetic and cultural forces. Darlington "took this way of thinking too far, but he was pointing in an important direction." Harman here may be too generous to Darlington. A genetics of behavior was born with the eugenics movement about the time of Darlington's birth. Crude and racist at the outset, it has been beset by both epistemological difficulties—how to tease out the contributions of genes from the influences of family, school, and culture?—and social bias for more than a century. But given that it remains a moral and social minefield, Harman's plea for intellectual tolerance is timely. He might have added that negotiating the field needs to be coupled with a more sensitive regard for social fact, implied stigmatization, and the deep epistemological difficulties of human behavioral genetics than Cyril Darlington ever displayed. ■

CORRESPONDENCE

Continued from page 4

the U.S. health insurance and delivery systems to make better use of the money we already spend. Another huge difference between my proposal and Canada's system is that I advocate the elimination of fee-for-service payment and the encouragement of capitated group practice, whereas Canada still mainly relies on fee-for-service payments to doctors in private practice. The kind of "consumer-directed" health care Pipes favors is a mirage, doomed to fail. My proposed solution may not be nearly as "utopian" as her blind faith in the magic of markets, because I am proposing changes that would in principle work and could produce a socially desirable result. There is no evidence to support similar claims for market-driven health care.

Steve Dawson also believes "health care is fundamentally an economic decision" and shares Pipes's faith in the market. I argue that markets can't—and don't—work in health care and that our present problems are the result of this misplaced faith. His assertions to the contrary don't deal with my arguments, and many of his factual claims are simply wrong. Private, investor-owned insurance plans have far higher overhead and administrative costs than government plans; high drug prices are *not* due to the FDA's regulations but to the drug companies that set the prices; the AMA has nothing like a "monopoly over labor supply"; and the cost of our tort system is a very small fraction of the total cost of health care. Lastly, he can't set aside "providing care to the poor" as "a separate issue." It is one of the important goals of any decent health care system, and we must recognize that market forces won't get us there.

I agree with Bernard Larner that the reforms I suggest would be difficult to implement—but, as I say, they are *not* impossible. I do not agree that rationing needs to be an initial part of the plan, if we mean by that term the withholding, for financial reasons, of services generally acknowledged to be medically justified. The reforms I suggest would enable us to provide all medically appropriate services without spending more than we do now.

HOME OFFICE

MANY THANKS TO JONATHAN COHN for raising the problem of absent fathers in the current wave of hand-wringing about the plight of upper-middle-class mothers ("Career Fair," March 14). In my own family, I'm the primary breadwinner, while my husband stays home with our toddler daughter. There are many reasons for this, not limited to my more lucrative career, his exceptional teaching and caregiving talents, our desire to have our daughter know us as individuals rather than as gender stereotypes, and my greater professional ambitions. We face the realization that we can't have it all every month at bill-paying time, if having it all includes the double-income comforts we previously enjoyed. Like Cohn, I am struck by how infrequently these trade-offs are cast as family decisions, rather than mothers' decisions, in the popular press and in academic debates. Cohn wonders if the preoccupation with mothering doesn't conveniently let men off the hook from considering their own choices. I would add that there appear to be many privileged women who find solace during baby's nap time in a nice cup of jasmine tea and a therapeutic read about the plight of mothers who would have been CEOs had they not made such an important sacrifice for their children.

JOSELYN ZIVIN
Chicago, Illinois

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SHENANDOAH DIARIST

Turning Red

PROVINCIALITY CUTS BOTH WAYS. I know this because, twice a week, I commute from western Virginia, in the heart of red America, to Washington, D.C., one of the bluest spots on the map. The trip takes three hours in both directions, brief as far as interplanetary travel goes. But the drive home illuminates plenty of cultural terrain. It usually begins at THE NEW REPUBLIC, where I regale my soft-handed colleagues with tales of pastoral life—the sumptuousness of chicken-fried steak; the hand-dug well that pumps the occasional tadpole into my sink; the subcontractors whom I routinely discover drinking beer in my bathtub. Their mirror image, most of us at TNR attended the same schools, respond to the same cultural cues, incline toward the same brand of liberal politics, eat the same ethnic foods. Most of us hail from Minsk, a few from Pinsk. If you wanted to paint TNR's staff, the Benjamin Moore chart would recommend a cobalt blue.

DRIVING DOWN 21ST STREET NW EN route to the highway reveals more evidence of blue-stateness—a George Washington University student protesting something or other; World Bank types mumbling into their cell phone headsets; a shiny BMW with doctor's tags. After about 15 miles on Route 66, the Metro line by the side of the highway ends and things get more purple. Once you get past the exit to Middleburg—Jackie O horse country—faded JOHN KERRY bumper stickers become SUPPORT OUR TROOPS bumper stickers, and the landscape quickly turns red. About 70 miles out, I follow a two-lane road for five miles, and then a one-lane road through the woods for another 25. The forest gives way to cleared pasture land bordered by lush, blue-green mountains. Then come the billboards—GOD BLESS AMERICA, JESUS LOVES YOU, and a sign that I'd only read about in history books but long dreamt of: LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT. I am home.

I HAVE GONE NATIVE, YET THE COUNTRY whose folkways and allure have seduced me is not Yemen or Nicaragua, but America— or, for those who still quibble that we are all Americans, red America. No Tanglewood here, not even summer stock. Just pristine expanses, crystal streams, and deep Southern accents. Whereas a year ago the locals regarded me as an anthropological curiosity, today I'm part of the landscape. No one pinches my fiancée anymore; no one charges me $500 to change the oil in my car; cops no longer pull me over for fun. At the country diner, where convertible-driving visitors from blue America occasionally wander in, I even join in the chorus of "goddamn tourists," when, invariably, the weekenders flee the cigarette smoke and iceberg lettuce.

THE IDEALIZATION OF RURAL LIFE, although no less pernicious than the Marxist indictment of the idiocy of rural life, is a well-chronicled malady. And the urban exiles that preceded my own exit to Eden make up a pretty sorry bunch. The German Romantics certainly made a hash of things. Closer to home, the legions of students who returned to the land in the 1960s made a hash of things, too—or, more exactly, rural life made a hash of them. As Eleanor Agnew recounts in her memoir, *Back From the Land*, holistic health care and poverty added up to a big bummer, dooming the bucolic counterculture. As for the latest demographic to make the pilgrimage, consisting mostly of retirees from the exurbs, they're considerably saner than their predecessors. But no less invasive.

BEING CONSERVATIVE TO BEGIN WITH, the "implants," as locals call them, haven't inflicted on western Virginia the sort of cultural depredations to which, say, New Yorkers bearing pottery wheels subjected Vermont. Nonetheless, their wealth has brought friction to this very poor town. Land is a farmer's 401(k), and farmers in the area have been cashing in, selling their farms to developers who erect McMansions in their place. The trend frightens me, because I'm following in the footsteps of an uncle who left the city for a nineteenth-century farmhouse on a gorgeous piece of land. He and it now sit squarely in the middle of a commercial parking lot. Here, too, the planning commission has become embroiled in a fight over zoning ordinances, and my neighbors whisper about "outside interests" and men from the "city" influencing the town's power brokers. It's like living in Deadwood.

WHY WOULD NEARLY ALL OF THE RESIdents of a town where the battle lines have been drawn around economic issues—in addition to the wealth gap between locals and implants, the county has endured several plant closings and a nearby Wal-Mart that shuttered much of Main Street—favor Republican politicians who represent these same outside forces? The paradox frustrates the organization Retro vs. Metro America, whose advertising campaign, funded by a billionaire who tried to clone his dog, bought up so much newspaper space during the run-up to last year's presidential election. "In voting for George Bush," the group revealed, "religious Americans were duped into voting against their best interests." The complaint amounts to a coarse echo of Thomas Frank's book *What's the Matter With Kansas?* Nothing that isn't the matter with Kalorama.

IS IT REALLY NECESSARY TO POINT OUT to residents of that and other wealthy, urban enclaves that casting a vote that transcends selfish interests is one of the hallmarks of a mature democracy? In voting so overwhelmingly Democratic, aren't they doing the same? Not everything, after all, boils down to economics. In my hometown, a once-thriving capital of bluegrass, the same cultural pollution that hangs over even the smallest U.S. towns clogs airwaves, movie theaters, and magazine stands alike. The drug trade has become ubiquitous, much of it sponsored by the same Central American gangs that dumped the body of a young woman under a wooden covered bridge on the bank of the nearby Shenandoah River. Most of all, my neighbors cling to a conception of the public good that threatens not only their piggy banks but their very lives. Dozens of them are serving, willingly and proudly, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the breadth of their civic attachments, it seems to me that they, more than most of their critics, most faithfully embody the American ideal. That, and the meadow outside my window, is enough to justify six hours on the highway—at least until the highway runs through my living room.

LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN

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Environmental False Alarms

HOOVER
DIGEST
RESEARCH AND
OPINION ON
PUBLIC POLICY



REE ISSUE

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In his new book, *Collapse,* Jared Diamond begins with a chapter on my home state of Montana. Although painting a romantic picture of "Big Sky Country," he decries environmental tragedies including toxic mining waste, forest fires, soil exhaustion, water shortages, and invasive species.

Diamond blames these environmental perils on miners, loggers, and farmers who "behaved as they did because the government required almost nothing of them" and because they were businesspeople maximizing profits.

Reading his gloom and doom chapter, one wonders why Ted Turner, Charles Schwab, and friends are buying land in Montana. The reason is that Montana's environment is not as trashed as alarmist Diamond would have us believe.

Here are the facts about Montana. You can drink from almost any stream without concern for toxic wastes, though you might worry about giardia from burgeoning elk herds. You can view millions of acres of spectacular forests—many on private lands. Farms remain productive, and lands mined at the turn of the century are being reclaimed. In short, **Montana's environment is getting better, not worse.**

The same holds generally in the developed world. From 1970 to 2000, for example, concentrations of carbon monoxide fell by 75 percent in the United States and by 95 percent in the United Kingdom. From 1975 to 2000, nitrogen oxides declined by 35 percent in the United States and by 40 percent in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, we in the United States are actually sequestering as much carbon through improved agricultural techniques, healthy forests, and sealed landfills as we are adding to the atmosphere's greenhouse gases.

Why is this so? First, as incomes rise, people demand and can afford a healthier environment. Study after study confirms that "wealthier is healthier."

Second, societies with a strong rule of law, private property rights, and market systems have better environments than those that do not. As more countries have adopted these institutions following the fall of the Iron Curtain, incomes and environmental quality have improved.

Diamond has it backward when he blames environmental problems on a lack of government regulation and too much private enterprise. On Montana's frontier, cattlemen formed voluntary associations to prevent overgrazing of the range. Farmers developed water rights to efficiently allocate water. In addition, mining companies compensated landowners if the companies' pollution spilled across their boundaries.

New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof likens environmentalist false alarms to car alarms that become "just an irritating background noise." It is time to turn off the alarms and recognize that our economic and environmental futures will be brighter if we rely more on private property and markets than on governmental regulations.

—Terry L. Anderson

Terry L. Anderson is the John and Jean DeNault Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the executive director of PERC—the Property and Environment Research Center located in Bozeman, Montana.

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
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PRODUCTION DESIGNER SARAH KNOWLES DIRECTOR OF PHOTOGRAPHY ROBBIE GREENBERG, ASC PRODUCED BY CHRISANN VERGES EXECUTIVE PRODUCERS MARK GORDON DELIA COSTAS WRITTEN BY MARGARET MAGLE DIRECTED BY JOSEPH SARGENT
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